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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the district court properly afforded appellant sufficient opportunity to

conduct discovery to oppose respondents' motion for summary judgment where: (1) discovery
was unnecessary because appellant's claims fail as a matter of law under this Court's recent
decision in Trotter; (2) respondents' motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary
judgment solely because of affidavits submitted by appellant; (3) appellant failed to satisfy
LR.C.P. 56(£)'s requirements for continuance of a summary judgment motion hearing; and (4)
appellant had months to conduct discovery and oppose summary judgment.

II.

Whether the district court properly awarded summary judgment to respondents

where: (1) appellant's claims fail as a matter of law under this Court's recent Trotter decision;
and (2) it was undisputed, based on public records subject to judicial notice, that respondents
complied with all requirements for non-judicial foreclosure under I.C. §§ 45-1505 and 45-1506.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Case

Although she admits defaulting on her residential mortgage loan, plaintiff/appellant
Leslie Jensen Edwards ("Edwards") brought this lawsuit in an attempt to prevent non-judicial
foreclosure under I.C. § 45-1505.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

Edwards filed her complaint pro se on April 1, 2010, in the Kootenai County District
Court. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R._") at 1-4.) Named as defendants were respondents
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), Quality Loan Services ("QLS"), and
Pioneer Lender Trustee Services, LLC ("Pioneer"), as well as Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB and
Aurora Loan Services. (R.1) Seeking to stop the non-judicial sale scheduled for April 8, 2010,
Edwards asserted two purported causes of action: (1) temporary and permanent injunction
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(Count I); and (2) declaratory judgment (Count II). (R.8-18.) While far from a model of clarity,
the gravamen of Edwards' complaint appeared to be that no defendant had "standing" to
foreclose under Edwards' deed of trust because no defendant owned the promissory note, which
purportedly had been sold or securitized. (R.4-7.)
On April 27, 2010, all defendants jointly filed a motion under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against any defendant.
(R.32.) The next day, counsel filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Edwards. (Trial Court
Docket Sheet ("D._") 1.) Although the district court previously had denied Edwards' motion for
a temporary restraining order (R.29, R.31), on May 5, 2010, defendants nevertheless stipulated
with Edwards to entry of an order postponing the foreclosure sale "until after the Court rules on
Defendant's [sic] motion to dismiss." (R.35. See also Transcript on Appeal ("T. ") 8-9, 16.) In
addition, at Edwards' request, on May 6, 2010, defendants stipulated to continue the motion to
dismiss hearing. (D.2.)
On May 14,2010, Edwards, through her new counsel, responded to the motion to dismiss
with a motion to amend the complaint. (R.37.) Over defendants' objection (R.65), on May 28,
2010, the district court allowed Edwards to amend her complaint and postponed the hearing on
defendants' motion to dismiss. (R.96; T.15-16.)

In large part, the amended complaint simply

repeated the initial pro se pleading's conclusory allegations that no defendant had "standing" to
foreclose because none of them owned the promissory note.

(R.103-108.)

The amended

complaint did not alter the two purported causes of action or the requested relief. (R.l 08-201.)
The only differences were that Edwards: (1) dropped claims against defendants Lehman Brothers
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Bank, FSB 1 and Aurora Loan Services (R.I0I-103); and (2) added speculative and conclusory
allegations (not causes of action) that the foreclosure was "fraudulent" because of purported
improprieties in documents recorded in the land records (R.l 06-1 08) and the supposed
bankruptcy of the original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB. (R.I03,106.)
On July 6, 2010, the remaining defendants-respondents MERS, Pioneer, and QLSagain moved to dismiss the amended complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). (R.I26; see also R.32;
R.65.) In addition, to rebut the speculative and conclusory allegations raised by Edwards in her
amended complaint, respondents asked the district court to take judicial notice of the following
public documents: (1) Kootenai County land records relating to Edwards' loan and foreclosure;
(2) United States Bankruptcy Court and Federal Reserve Board records relating to Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s bankruptcy filing, and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB's name change to
Aurora Bank, FSB; and (3) Idaho Secretary of State licensing records relating to QLS and
Pioneer. (R.I23; D.3.)
Edwards responded to respondents' motion to dismiss by filing: (1) two separate requests
to convert respondents' motion to a motion for summary judgment and to continue the hearing to
allow discovery (R.128, R.I41); (2) an objection to judicial notice of public records submitted by
defendants (R.143; 0.4); and (3) an affidavit of a purported expert forensic loan examiner,
Charles Homer. (T.24; D.4.) On August 9, 2010, in response to Edwards' attempt to convert the
motion to summary judgment and objection to judicial notice, defendants submitted the
supplemental affidavit of their trial counsel, Holger Uhl, attesting that the public records
submitted by respondents were true and correct copies obtained by Uhl. (D.4.) On August 13,

I In her appeal brief, Edwards incorrectly refers to "Lehman Brothers Bank" as an "Appellee."
(Appellant's Br. at 7.) Given that Edwards dropped Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB as a defendant
when she amended her complaint, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlk/a Aurora Bank, FSB, is not
properly a party to this appeal.
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2010, Edwards moved to strike Uhl's affidavit, and the public records attached thereto, on the
grounds that Uhl purportedly lacked personal knowledge and his testimony was inadmissible
hearsay. (D.4.)
A hearing took place on August 20, 2010 (T .19), after defendants once again
accommodated Edwards' request for a postponement of the hearing previously scheduled for
July 29, 2010.

(D.4.)

The district court concluded that Edwards failed to satisfy the

requirements for a continuance for discovery under I.R.c.P. 56(f). (T.2l, T.29-30, T.32.)
Nevertheless, the district court: (1) decided to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment; (2) postponed the summary judgment hearing to September 30, 2010; (3)
allowed Edwards to pursue discovery in the interim; and (4) allowed Edwards to submit more
affidavit testimony from purported expert loan forensic examiner Homer. (T.29, T.33, T.36.)
The district court also indicated that it would hear and decide any motions to strike the Homer
affidavit and/or the public records and Uhl affidavit in conjunction with summary judgment
motion. (T.34, T.36.)
On September 16, 2010, Edwards submitted a second affidavit from Homer.

(D.4.)

Defendants moved to strike the Homer affidavits on the grounds that, among other things,
Homer was not qualified as an expert and his report consisted of improper legal conclusions.
(R.145.)
The motion for summary judgment and motions to strike were heard on September 30,
2010. (T.38.) By written order dated November 16,2010, the district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment. (R.154.) While it ostensibly treated the motion as one for
summary judgment, the district court concluded that it could take judicial notice of the public
records submitted by respondents (R.151) and that respondents were entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law. (R.163.) Based on the undisputed public documents submitted by respondents,
the district court found the following facts to be undisputed: (1) the original lender, Lehman
Brothers Bank, FSB, had changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB, and had not filed bankruptcy;
(2) under Edwards' deed of trust, MERS was the beneficiary as the agent for Lehman Brothers
Bank, FSB, nlkla Aurora Bank, FSB, and its successors and assigns; (3) Pioneer was the trustee;
(4) QLS was the agent/attorney in fact for Pioneer; (5) MERS, acting through Pioneer and its
agent QLS, had the authority to foreclose on behalf of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlkla
Aurora Bank, FSB, and its successors and assigns; and (6) respondents complied with all
statutory recording and notice requirements for non-judicial foreclosure.

(R.156-161.)

The

district court thus concluded that respondents had the authority to foreclose and had complied
with all statutory prerequisites to non-judicial foreclosure. (R.l61-165.) The district court also
denied Edwards' motion to strike the Uhl affidavit and objection to judicial notice of the public
records, as well as respondents' motion to strike the Homer affidavit. (R.151-53.)
On December 1, 2010, Edwards moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment
order. (R.167.) After receiving additional briefing from the parties (R.175, R.185, D.5), but
without oral argument (R.180), the district court issued a written order denying reconsideration
on February 18,2011. (R.189.)
Judgment was entered in favor of respondents on January 24, 2011. (R.169.) On March
4, 2011, Edwards, through her trial counsel, filed a notice of appeal (R.198), though apparently
she is now proceeding with the appeal pro se and looking for replacement counsel. (Appellant's
Br. at 35.) Edwards filed her opening brief on November 16,2011. By order of this Court, dated
December 29,2011, the due date for respondents' brief was stayed pending the Court's decision
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in Trotter v. Bank of NY Mellon, appeal no. 38022-2011. Trotter was decided on March 23,
2012. See Trotter v. Bank ofN Y Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012).

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

Edwards' Mortgage Loan

On or about May 18, 2005, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, lent Edwards $345,000, at a 6%
interest rate, to refinance her existing residential mortgage loan with American Gold Mortgage
Corporation. (R.124 - Ex. A p. 2; see also R.124 - Exs. J & L.) In return, Edwards executed a
promissory note in favor of Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB. (Id.) In addition, to secure repayment
of the note, Edwards executed a uniform Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac deed of trust on residential
real property at 17287 West Summerfield Road, Post Falls, Idaho, 83854 in Kootenai County
(the "Property"). (R.124 - Ex. A at p. 3.) The deed of trust identifies Edwards as "borrower;"
Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB as "lender;" MERS as "beneficiary" in a representative capacity as
"nominee" on behalf of the lender and its "successors and assigns;" and Alliance Title and
Escrow ("Alliance") as "trustee." (Id. at pp. 2-3.)
The deed of trust authorizes MERS to take all necessary actions on the lender's behalf,
including foreclosure, discharge, or release of the security interest. (Id. at p. 4.) The deed of
trust provides, in part:
"MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate
corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary under
this Security Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under
the laws of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number of
P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI, 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679-MERS.
(Id. at p. 1 (emphasis added).)
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the
successors and assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures
to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and renewals, extensions
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and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of
Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably
grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the
[Property] ....
... Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal
title to the interests granted by borrower in this Security
Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS
(as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has
the right: to exercise any or all of [Lender'sj interests, including,
but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and
to take any action required of Lender, including, but not limited
to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
(Id. at pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).)

The deed of trust also advised Edwards that "[t]he Note or a partial interest in the Note
(together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to

Borrower." (Id. at p. 11 (emphasis added).)
At closing, Edwards initialed each page of the deed of trust, including those pages
referencing MERS, and signed the deed of trust, which was then acknowledged by a notary. (Id.
at pp. 2-3, 14-15.)

The deed of trust was then duly recorded in the Kootenai County land

records on May 25, 2005. (Id. at p. 1.)
With the loan from Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, Edwards refinanced here prior
mortgage loan with American Gold Mortgage Corporation, dated October 24,2003. (R.124 - Ex.
J at p. 2.) That prior loan was evidenced by a separate promissory note, as well as a deed of trust

to the Property recorded in the Kootenai County land records on October 29,2003. (Id. at pp. 13.) That prior deed of trust listed American Gold Mortgage Corporation as "lender;" MERS as
"beneficiary" in a representative capacity as "nominee" on behalf of the lender and its
"successors and assigns;" and Alliance as "trustee." (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Because the prior loan was
paid off through the refinancing, MERS, in its capacity as beneficiary under the prior deed of
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trust, executed a Substitution of Trustee, dated June 1, 2005, which replaced Alliance with
Fidelity National Title Company ("Fidelity"). (R.124 - Ex. K.) Acting on behalf of MERS as
beneficiary on behalf of American Gold Mortgage and its successors and assigns, Fidelity
executed a Deed of Reconveyance, dated June 8, 2005, indicating that Edwards' prior loan "has
been paid in full." (R.124 - Ex. L.) On June 21, 2005, Fidelity recorded both the Substitution of
Trustee and the Deed of Reconveyance in the Kootenai County land records. (R.124 - Ex. K &
L.)

2.

Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB's Name Change

On April 27, 2009, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB.
(R.124 - Exs. F & G.)

3.

Edwards' Default and the Resulting Foreclosure

Edwards does not dispute 2 that she defaulted on her mortgage loan in August 2009, and
has not made any payments since, despite continuing to occupy the Property. (R.124 - Ex. D.)
As a result of Edwards' default, on or about November 30, 2009, MERS, as deed of trust
beneficiary on behalf of the lender and its successors and assigns, executed an Appointment of
Successor Trustee, replacing Alliance with Pioneer as trustee and QLS as attorney in fact for
Pioneer. (R.124 - Ex. B.) The Appointment of Successor Trustee was recorded in the Kootenai
County land records on December 3, 2009. (Id.) That same day, Pioneer, as trustee, and acting
through its attorney in fact, QLS, recorded in the Kootenai County land records a Notice of
Default and Election to Sell, which indicated that Edwards had been in default since August
2009. (R.124 - Ex. D.)

2 See number 22 of Plaintiffs Response QLS' First Set of Request for Admission, submitted to
the district court on or about August 5, 2010, in connection with defendants' motion to compel
discovery responses from plaintiff. (D.4.) See also Affidavit of Leslie Jensen Edwards,
submitted to the district court on or about April 1, 2010. (D.l.)
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On December 9, 2009, after the recording of the Notice of Default and Election to Sell,
but more than 120 days before the trustee's sale, Pioneer, through QLS, sent to Edwards via
registered or certified mail a Notice of Trustee's Sale stating that the Property would be sold at
public auction on April 8, 2010. (R.124 - Ex. C.) In addition, personal service of the Notice of
Trustee Sale was attempted, and the Notice was posted at the Property, on December 11, 19, and
29,2009. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Further, the Notice of Trustee's Sale was published in the Coeur d'
Alene Press, a print newspaper serving Kootenai County, for four consecutive weeks, beginning
December 23, 2009, and ending January 13, 2010. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Affidavits of mailing,
posting, and publication of the Notice of Trustee's Sale were recorded in the Kootenai County
land records on or about February 10, 2010. (Id.) The sale did not take place on April 8, 2010
because Edwards filed this lawsuit.

4.

MERS and the MERS® System
a.

Title Problems Prior to MERS

At origination of a residential mortgage loan, a borrower executes a promissory note
(obligating the borrower to repay the loan) and a separate security instrument (granting a security
interest in the real estate as collateral in the event of default on the note).

Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). Unlike the note, the
security instrument-typically a mortgage or, as in this case, a deed of trust-is recorded in the
county in which the property is located pursuant to state law. Id.; Jackson v. Mortg. Elec.

Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490-491 (Minn. 2009).
After origination, lenders routinely sell mortgage loans on the secondary mortgage
market and such loans may be sold several times in whole or in part or bundled into mortgagebacked securities. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1038-39; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. The lender that
owns the note has the right to receive repayment of the underlying indebtedness and ultimately
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the sale proceeds in the event of a default and foreclosure of the security instrument. Cervantes,
656 F.3d at 1038. In addition, the contractual right to service the loan for the lender routinely
changes hands. Id. After origination, the loan "servicer" deals directly with the borrower and
administers the loan (e.g., collects payments from the borrower, ensures that real estate taxes and
insurance premiums are paid, and remits payments to the owner(s) of the note).3 Id. Pursuant to

uee requirements for negotiable

instruments, notes are negotiated either by indorsement and

delivery, or in the event the note is bearer paper, just by delivery, Horvath, 641 F.3d at 621;
Idaho Stat. §§ 28-3-201, 3-204, 3-205, while assignments of servicing rights typically occur by
contract, see R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34.
Transfers of notes and assignments of servicing rights are not susceptible to recording in
county land records. See id.

Historically, transfer (i.e., negotiation) of a note to a new lender

often, but not always, was accompanied by a separate assignment of the trust deed (substituting a
new beneficiary) that was recorded in the county land records. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039;

Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. But as secondary market transfers increased, "[t]his recording
process became cumbersome to the mortgage industry," Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039, because
"multiple assignments of the security instrument commonly caused confusion, delays, and chainof-title problems," Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. These problems were exacerbated in the 1980s
due to the inability to obtain assignments, satisfactions, and reconveyances from collapsed
S&LS.4 MERS was formed in the aftermath of the S&L crisis, Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490, to
eliminate the foregoing title problems and inefficiencies, which adversely affected the residential
3

See also R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life On MERS, 11 PROB. & PROP. 32, 34 (1997).

E.g., Jeffrey J. Miller, The Effect of the S&L Bailout on Title to Real Property, 5 PROB. & PROP.
44, 47-49 (1991) (discussing various title-related issues with S&Ls in the 1980s); R.K. Arnold,
supra, at 34 (discussing delays); see also Allen H. Jones, Setting the Record Straight on MERS,
Mortg. Banking 34 (May 2011).
4
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finance industry's ability to efficiently provide home financing to consumers. Id; Cervantes, 656
F.3dat 1039.

h.

Role and Benefit of MERS

MERS does not originate, lend, service, or invest in home loans. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at
1039-40.

Instead, MERS serves two primary functions for the residential lending industry.

First, MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., operates the MERS® System, a private electronic database
that tracks transfers of promissory notes (and changes in loan servicers), Cervantes, 656 F.3d at
1038, by a Mortgage Identification Number ("MIN") assigned to each loan, Jackson, 770
N.W.2d at 490-91. 5 The shareholders ofMERSCORP and the members of the MERS® System
include lenders who originate, invest in, or service loans, Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1039 (citing

Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490-91), including government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, see MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E. 2d 81,83 n.2 (N.Y. 2006). Borrowers
can learn the identity of the lender who owns their note (referred to on the MIN Summary as the
"investor") and the servicer by calling the toll-free number listed in the trust deed (or mortgage),

see, e.g., R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust), or by accessing the MERS website,
www.mersinc.org. 6 Prior to MERS, there was no system for tracking such interests, which are
not reflected in county land records. See R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34.

Second, and wholly distinct from the MERS® System database, MERSCORP's
subsidiary, Appellee MERS, acts as the "beneficiary" in the trust deed (or mortgagee in
mortgage) as the agent (i. e. nominee) of the lender that owns the note and the lender's successors
5

See R.K. Arnold, supra, at 34.

6 Although the disclosure of the note owner is optional, 97% of the over 3,000 MERS members
disclose their identity. E.g., Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure:
Hearing Before the Sub. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111 th Congo (Nov. 16,
2010) (statement ofR.K. Arnold, President and CEO, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc.), http://banking.senate.gov.
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and assigns. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040; see, e.g., R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust).
This is accomplished at origination, when the borrower, lender, and MERS all agree in the deed
of trust (or mortgage)-including uniform deeds of trust (and mortgages) drafted by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac-that MERS will serve this role. See, e.g., R.l24 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of
trust). These security instruments are recorded in the public land records identifying MERS as
the holder oflegal and record title to the security interest. Jackson, 770 N. W.2d at 490; see, e.g.,
R.124 - Ex. A. (Edwards' deed of trust as recorded in Kootenai County land records).
With MERS' two distinct functions, subsequent transfers of notes (and assignments of
servicing rights) are tracked in the MERS database, but are not recorded in the public land
records, Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040, because notes are not susceptible to recordation, see KK.
Arnold, supra, at 34.

When a note is transferred-i.e., negotiated (by endorsement and/or

delivery) to a new lender-there is no separate assignment of the trust deed because there is no
change in the beneficiary (or mortgagee) or holder of legal and record title. Id; Jackson, 770
N.W.2d at 491 & n.2. Rather, MERS remains the trust deed beneficiary in the public land
records on behalf of the new lender. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1040. These services MERS
provides benefit lenders, borrowers, the title industry, and local governments in numerous ways,
including, but not limited to: providing a source for information (e.g., promissory note transfers
and loan ownership) not otherwise available; reducing recording errors and delays and the
resulting uncertainty and title problems; and increasing efficiency and reducing costs.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court's decision on a request under
I.R.C.P. 56(f) to allow time for discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion. See Carnell v.
Barker Mgmt., Inc., 48 P.3d 651, 658 (Idaho 2002) (citations omitted). "In determining whether
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a trial court abused its discretion this Court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion for summary
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. See Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96
P.3d 623, 626 (Idaho 2004). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to jUdgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P.
56( c). The party opposing the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but that party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." LR.C.P. 56(e). Thus,
"while reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, the non-moving
party cannot rest upon mere speculation," Finholt v. Cresto, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (Idaho 2007), or
"conclusory assertions," Partout v. Harper, 183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008). "A mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue." Ryan v. Beisner, 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Idaho 1992)
(citations omitted). "[T]he moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Partout, 183 P.3d at 776 (citation
omitted).
Applying these familiar standards, this Court should affirm the district court's decision in
all respects.

52114402.2

- 13 -

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PUBLIC
RECORDS AND DISMISSED EDWARDS' COMPLAINT WITHOUT
EXTENSIVE DELAY FOR UNNECESSARY DISCOVERY
Edwards argues that the district court improperly converted respondents' motion to

dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and then accepted inadmissible evidence from
respondents, while depriving Edwards of discovery necessary to oppose respondents' motion.
(Appellant's Br. at 9-13,34-35.) Nothing could be further from the truth.
A.

Trotter Confirms that Discovery Was Unnecessary

To begin with, Edwards only vaguely argued below, and repeats with the same
imprecision here on appeal, that she was entitled to undefined discovery that she believes would
enable her to uncover respondents' purported lack of "standing" to foreclose. (T.31; see also
R.128, R.141, R.167.) As best as MERS can tell, Edwards wants discovery on ownership of her
promissory note because, in her view, lack of ownership of the note means lack of standing to
foreclose. But such "standing" or "note ownership" discovery was irrelevant and unnecessary
for two reasons. First, in its recent Trotter decision, this Court held, as a matter of law, that
there is no requirement of "standing"-i.e., no obligation to show an ownership interest in the
note-to commence non-judicial foreclosure. See Trotter, 275 P.3d 857 (discussed infra § III.)
Edwards even concedes that standing presents "questions oflaw" for the court. (Appellant's Br.
at 14.) Second, the indisputable public records, including the deed of trust Edwards signed in
return for $345,000, established as a matter of law that MERS, as beneficiary on behalf of the
lender that owns the note, had explicit authority to appoint Pioneer as successor trustee and direct
Pioneer to foreclose on behalf of the note owner. (See supra § IILA.) In sum, the discovery
sought by Edwards was irrelevant.

52114402.2

- 14 -

B.

Respondents' Motion Was Converted to Summary Judgment Because of
Edwards' Affidavits

Furthermore, it was Edwards, not respondents, who (1) twice asked the district court to
covert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment (R.l28, R.141, T.22) and (2)
submitted evidence outside the pleadings-i.e., two purported expert affidavits (T.24; D.4)-that
led the district court to ostensibly treat the motion as one for summary judgment.

(T.29.)

Respondents maintain, as they did below (R.145), that the district court erred in considering the
affidavits of Edwards' purported expert forensic loan examiner Charles Homer, on the grounds
that, among other things: (1) Homer was not qualified as a expert and his affidavits contained
inadmissible legal opinions;7 and (2) the Federal Trade Commission has cautioned that such
forensic loan audits are consumer scams. 8 But leaving that issue aside, it is clear that it was the
Homer affidavits submitted by Edwards, not anything submitted by respondents, that were
outside the pleadings and led the district court to treat respondents' motion as one for summary
judgment.
Indeed, the district court correctly took judicial notice, under LR.E. 201, of the "public
records of Kootenai County [], the Idaho Secretary of State, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, sources whose accuracy

See Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)
(expert legal opinions are inadmissible and improper because interpretation of the law is
exclusively within the province of the court).
7

8 "Fraudulent foreclosure 'rescue' professionals use half-truths and outright lies to sell services
that promise relief to homeowners in distress .... [T]he latest foreclosure rescue scam to exploit
financially strapped homeowners pitches forensic mortgage loan audits. In exchange for an
upfront fee of several hundred dollars, so-called forensic loan auditors ... offer to review your
mortgage loan documents to determine whether your lender complied with state and federal
mortgage lending laws. The 'auditors' say you can use the audit report to avoid foreclosure,
accelerate the loan modification process, reduce your loan principal, or even cancel your loan."
FTC Consumer Alert (March 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/eduipubs/consumerialerts/altI77.shtm
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cannot reasonably be questioned." (R.151.) It is well-settled that a court may take judicial
notice of such public records in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, without converting

the motion to one for summary judgment. 9 See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500,
504 (9th Cir. 1986) ("we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the
pleadings"). Thus, it was the Homer affidavits submitted by Edwards, not the public records
submitted by respondents, that must have led the district court to treat the motion as a summary
judgment motion. Given that it was Edwards who requested that the motion be converted to
summary judgment, based on extra-pleading evidence (expert affidavits) that she alone
submitted, she should not be heard now to argue that the motion was improperly converted
without allowing her time for discovery.
Edwards also argues that the district court improperly accepted hearsay testimony from
respondents' trial counsel, Holger Uhl, and she makes the speculative argument that the public
records attached to Uhl's affidavit "are most probably false, inaccurate, and grossly negligent."
(Appellant's Br. at 34-35 (emphasis added).) These arguments lack merit. In his affidavit, Uhl
merely attached the public records and attested, based on his personal knowledge, that the
records were true and correct copies that he himself obtained. (D.4 - Supplemental Affidavit of
Holger Ulh, dated August 9, 2010.) As the district court correctly concluded, not only does
Uhl's affidavit satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of LR.E. 602, it also meets hearsay
exceptions under I.R.E. 803(6) ("records of regularly conducted activity"), 803(8) ("public
records and reports"), and 803(14) and (15) ("documents affecting interests in property").

See also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Pro. § 1357 (3d ed. 1998)
("items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record
of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned; these
items may be considered by the district judge without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment").
9
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Edwards' self-serving conjecture about purported fraudulent, without more, is insufficient to cast
doubt on the veracity of these public records. See Hien Phan v. Bank of N. Y, --- F. Supp. 2d ----,
2012 WL 1222572, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10,2012) (rejecting as baseless the "bald assertion that
the Note and other documents in the record are not authentic," "bare allegations that ... inclusion
of MERS as beneficiary in Deed of Trust and the appointment of successor trustee were
somehow 'fraudulent,'" and "speculative assertion that certain documents in the record are
signed by individuals lacking authority").

C.

Edwards Failed to Comply With Rule 56(0

In any event, Edwards failed to comply with Rule 56(f)'s prerequisites for postponing
summary judgment and allowing discovery. Rule 56(f) gives the district court discretion to
continue the hearing and allow discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion "[s]hould it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition .... " LR.C.P. 56(f) (emphasis
added). A continuance should not be granted unless the movant actually submits an affidavit as
required by Rule 56(f). See Golay v. Loomis, 797 P.2d 95, 97, 99 (Idaho 1990) (district court
acted within its discretion to deny continuance where moving party did not submit required Rule
56(f) affidavit); Prather v. Indus. Inv. Corp., 429 P.2d 414, 415 (Idaho 1967) (district court acted
within its discretion in denying Rule 56(f) motion where movant did not "present an affidavit
containing reasons ... why he was then unable to state 'affidavit facts essential to justify his
position''') (citations omitted).
In addition, any Rule 56(f) affidavit must clearly articulate the specific reasons for the
continuance and the relevant discovery needed to oppose the motion. See Jenkins v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380,386 (Idaho 2005) (affirming denial of Rule 56(f) motion that "did

not specify what discovery was needed" and "did not set forth how the evidence he expected to
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gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude summary judgment"); Taylor v.
AlA Services Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 849 (Idaho 2011) (affirming denial of 56(f) motion when the

request was "based on mere speculation and on presumptions unsupported by fact or law ...
Plaintiff has provided the Court with no reasonable basis to believe additional discovery will
produce new or relevant information not previously disclosed .... ").
Here, although Edwards filed two motions for a continuance (R.128, R.141), she never
submitted any Rule 56(f) "affidavit," much less explained with the required specificity the
particular discovery she purportedly needed to respond to respondents' motion. At the hearing
on Edwards' motions for a continuance, the district court correctly explained to Edwards'
counsel:
Rule 56(f) does not stand for the proposition [that] if this becomes
a summary judgment [motion] ... [Edwards] gets to complete
discovery prior to the hearing. [Rule 56(f)] allows me upon a good
showing ... to allow certain [discovery] to meet ... the summary
judgment motion, but not to engage in just overall or incomplete
discovery. So what exactly is it [Edwards] need to complete to
meet the Motion for Summary Judgment?
(T.29.) But Edwards failed to articulate specifically any meaningful discovery she needed in
order to respond to respondents' motion.
D.

Edwards Was Afforded Sufficient Opportunity to Oppose the Motion

Edwards takes isolated snippets of the district court's transcript out of context in a
misleading attempt to (incorrectly) paint the district court as depriving her of the opportunity to
oppose respondents' dispositive motion. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) In reality, however, Edwards
was not denied sufficient time to prepare her case or to make arguments.
Edwards filed this lawsuit on April 1, 2010 (R.1), some seven months before it was
dismissed on November 16, 2010. (R.147.) While the case was originally commenced by
Edwards pro se, she had counsel by at least April 28, 2010. (D.l.) What is more, the hearing on
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Respondents' motion to dismiss (originally filed on April 27, 2010) was delayed at least four
times before it was ultimately heard on September 30, 2010. The hearing was delayed once
because Edwards moved to amend her complaint. (T.l6; R.37.) It was delayed twice more (on
May 6 and July 28, 2010) because respondents consented to a postponement of the hearing at
Edwards' request. (D.2, DA.) And, in response to Edwards' Rule 56(0 motion, the district court
again postponed the hearing from August 20, 2009 until September 30, 2009, and told Edwards
she could engage in discovery in the interim. (T.32, T.36, T.38.) If that were not enough, the
district court accepted and considered (improperly in respondents' view) two affidavits from
Edwards' purported expert forensic loan examiner, Charles Horner.

(T.l53.)

And, when

Edwards finally got around to actually serving discovery in late August 2010, MERS and the
other respondents properly and fully responded. (D.5 - Notices of Compliance, filed Sept. 29,
2010.)
Simply put, Edwards was afforded plenty of opportunity to conduct discovery and
present arguments in opposition to respondents' dispositive motion.

Her arguments to the

contrary are baseless and should be rejected.
E.

The Authority Cited by Edwards Is Inapposite

In an apparent attempt to prejudice respondents with this Court, Edwards cites two cases
from other jurisdictions for the sweeping and unfounded proposition that every entity associated
with the lending industry is part of some massive conspiracy to deprive plaintiff borrowers of
legitimate discovery.

(Appellant's Br. at 11-12.) Of course, neither case is even close to

germane to this appeal.
Neither case involved MERS or any other appellee, much less standing or authority to
initiate non-judicial foreclosure, or even a Rule 56(0 motion to continue a motion for summary
judgment for discovery purposes. In re Wilson, No. 07-11862 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2011)
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involved "contentious discovery" with "responses, oppositions and replies" to ten discovery
motions, id. at *14, in a lawsuit about whether a lender processing service adequately tracked
mortgage payments and verified information in affidavits before signing them, id. at 18-20.

Phillips v. Us. Bank NA, No. ll-CV-00504 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 2,2011), is a Georgia trial
court denial of a motion to dismiss by a defendant bank who apparently had not provided
plaintiff with the reason he was denied a modification under the federal HAMP program. Any
conduct of the particular defendants in In re Wilson or Phillips, or any frustration of the judges
with those defendants, is not applicable to, or justifiably directed against, MERS or any other
respondents, who fully responded to Edwards' discovery and acted within their rights in filing a
threshold Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in this case.
For all the foregoing reasons, the district court properly took judicial notice of public
records, afforded Edwards sufficient time to oppose the motion, and then decided the motion
without extensive delay for meaningless discovery.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENTS
HAD "STANDING" TO FORECLOSE NON-JUDICIALLY UNDER IDAHO
CODE §§ 45-1505 AND 45-1506
A.

Respondents Were Not Required to Establish Note Ownership

Edwards argues, as she did below, that respondents lacked "standing" to foreclose on the
deed of trust because no appellee "owned" the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt.

(See Appellant's Br. at 14-22, 28-30.)

Edwards standing or "show me the note" theory is

incorrect as a matter of law. Indeed, this Court expressly rejected the exact same theory in a
decision issued since the district court dismissed Edwards' complaint. See Trotter, 275 P.3d 857.
In Trotter, the borrower, like Edwards, executed a standardized deed of trust naming
MERS as "beneficiary" on behalf of the originating lender and its successors and assigns. Id. at
*3. After the borrower defaulted on the loan, MERS assigned the deed of trust to another lender,
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the lender then appointed a successor trustee, and the successor trustee initiated non-judicial
foreclosure under Idaho Code § 45-1505. Id.

Like Edwards, the borrower sued the lender,

MERS and the trustee, asserting claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, in an effort to
prevent foreclosure.

Id. at *3-4.

Like Edwards, the borrower asserted that none of the

defendants had "standing" to foreclose because none of them had established ownership of the
promissory note memorializing the underlying debt. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the
district court granted their motion. Id. at *4.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, "hold[ing] that, pursuant to I.C. § 45-1505, a trustee may

initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership
of the underlying note or demonstrating that the deed of trust beneficiary has requested or
authorized the trustee to initiate those proceedings. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). In other words,
"there is no statutory requirement [under § 45-1505] for the trustee to prove standing before
initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure on a deed of trust. ... " Id. The Court explained: "fNJothing in

the text of the statute can reasonably be read to require the trustee to prove it has 'standing'
before foreclosing. Instead, the plain language of the statute makes it clear that the trustee may
foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements contained within the Act." Id.
(emphasis added). Because there was no dispute that the defendants had complied with all the
requirements for non-judicial foreclosure under the statute, the Court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the borrower's complaint. Id.
Edwards contends that there is "not yet controlling precedent in Idaho" (Appellant's Br.
at 22), and that two decisions by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho
constitute the "most persuasive case law relating to this appeal" (id. at 14) and "represent the
current state of the law in Idaho." (Id. at 16.) Of course, Edwards filed her appeal brief before
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Trotter, which now represents the "controlling precedent in Idaho" she was looking for.
Moreover, Trotter expressly rejected reliance on the same two bankruptcy cases-In re Wilhelm
and In re Sheridan.

Trotter described those bankruptcy cases as "relat[ing] to standing in

bankruptcy proceedings and whether MERS met the statutory, constitutional, and prudential
requirements to bring a motion in a bankruptcy court." Id. Trotter then explained that there are
no such standing requirements for non-judicial foreclosure in Idaho:
While it is true that a party must have standing before it may
invoke the jurisdiction of a court, the [non-judicial] foreclosure
process in [Idaho Code § 45-1505] is not a judicial proceeding.
Instead, "the procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the
judicial process provide the express-lane alternative to foreclosure
in the judicial system and strip borrowers of protections embedded
in a judicial foreclosure." Thus, as an "alternative" that is "outside
the judicial process," [§ 45-1505 alone] sets forth all of the
requirements toforeclose on a deed of trust.

Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). Trotter thus distinguished In re Wilhelm and In re
Sheridan as "federal bankruptcy cases that are inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial
foreclosure." Id. n.3 (emphasis added).
Not surprisingly, consistent with Trotter, numerous Idaho trial courts, both state and
federal, have dismissed wrongful foreclosure claims virtually identical to those asserted by
Edwards here. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. CV-11-4920, slip
op. at 10-13 (Kootenai County Dist. Ct. April 11, 2012) (rejecting claims that (1) MERS was not
proper beneficiary and could not assign deed of trust to foreclosing lender and (2) deed of trust
unenforceable because the note was owned by a different party) (Attachment A); Hobson v.

Wells Fargo Bank NA., No.1 :11-cv-00196-BLW, 2012 WL 505917, *3-5 (D. Idaho Feb. 15,
2012) (same); Mortensen v. ACE Mortg. Funding, LLC, No. CV-OC-2011-20448, slip op. at
*12-15 (Ada County Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 2012) (rejecting claims that (1) foreclosing party must
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show it owns the note to initiate non-judicial and (2) MERS was not proper beneficiary and thus
could not assign deed of trust to foreclosing lender) (Attachment B); Russell v. One West Bank,
FSB, No. 1:11-cv-00222-BLW, 2012 WL 442903, at *1-2 (D. Idaho Feb. 10,2012) (rejecting

claim that foreclosing party must produce note to have standing to initiate non-judicial
foreclosure); Bacon v. Countrywide Bank, No. No. 2:11-cv-00107-EJL-CWD, 2012 WL
639521, at *9-11 (D. Idaho Feb. 8, 2012) (dismissing claim that no defendant had authority to
foreclose because note and deed of trust were split); see also Gordon v. Fed Nat 'I Mortg. Ass 'n,
No. CV-2011-1069, slip op. at (Bingham County Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2012) (rejecting argument
that MERS is not proper beneficiary and that note and deed of trust were split rendering it
unenforceable) (Attachment C); Washburn v. Bank of Am., NA., No. 1:11-cv-00193-EJL-CWD,
2012 WL 139213, at *2 (D. Idaho Jan. 17,2012) (rejecting note ownership standing argument)
As Trotter confirms, Idaho Code § 45-1505 permits a deed of trust beneficiary (i. e.,
MERS) to direct the trustee (i.e., Pioneer) to foreclose and auction the property, subject only to
the strictures of the statute.

Here, as in Trotter, the Kootenai County public land records

irrefutably establish respondents' compliance with all statutory requirements for non-judicial
foreclosure. First, pursuant to § 45-1505(1), the deed of trust executed by Edwards and naming
MERS as "beneficiary," and MERS' subsequent appointment of Pioneer as successor trustee,
were recorded in the public land records. (R.124 - Exs. A & B.) Second, as required by § 451505(2), Edwards' admitted failure to make payments constitutes a default under the express
terms of the deed of trust authorizing sale of the property. (R.124 - Ex. A.) Third, the trustee,
Pioneer, through its attorney in fact, QLS, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, as
mandated by § 45-1505(2). (R.124 - Ex. D.)

Fourth, consistent with § 45-1506(2), after

recording the Notice of Default and Election to Sell, but more than 120 days before the
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scheduled trustee sale, Pioneer, through QLS, sent a Notice of Trustee's Sale to Edwards via
certified or registered mail. (R.124 - Ex. C.) Fifth, personal service of the Notice of Sale was
attempted and then posted conspicuously at the Property on three separate occasions, per the
command of § 4S-1S06(S). (!d.) Sixth, as directed by § 4S-1S06(S), the notice of sale was
published in a newspaper covering Kootenai County. (Id.) Finally, affidavits of mailing, posting,
and publication of notice of sale were recorded pursuant to § 4S-1S06(6). (Id.)
In sum, this Court's recent Trotter decision is dispositive of Edwards' appeal.

The

district court's decision below should be affirmed.
B.

MERS Is a Proper Beneficiary Under Idaho Law

Edwards also apparently challenges MERS ability to serve as "beneficiary." Edwards
evidently claims that only the owner of the note can serve as beneficiary. She criticizes MERS
as a "phantom beneficiary" (Appellant's Bf. at 12), based on a "self-appointed designation" and
"mere invocation of the term" (id. at IS), "empty words," (id. at 16), and "fabricated labels" (id
at 30). MERS, she says, is not the "true" (id. at 22) or "actual" beneficiary (id. at 29) because
MERS does not own the note. MERS is just a database that "tracks ownership of the lien" (id. at
IS, 19) with no "authority to do anything" (id. at 16,28), particularly "foreclose" (id. at 16,17,

29). Edwards' improper beneficiary theory is simply a recasting of her baseless standing or
"show me the note" theory.

Her improper beneficiary theory turns entirely upon the same

underlying premise that only the owner of the note may foreclose. This underlying premise was
already rejected in Trotter. See Mortensen, supra, slip op. at *14 (reading Trotter as foreclosing
argument that "MERS 'cannot demonstrate that it is the beneficiary as defined by statute, and as
such, lacks the standing to assign [deed of trust]").
Even if Trotter were not dispositive, it is clear that MERS is a proper beneficiary. Idaho
Code § 4S-1S02( 1) defines "Beneficiary" as "the person named or otherwise designated in a
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trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and
who shall not be the trustee." (Emphasis added). Nothing in the statute mentions the note, much
less requires that note owner be the beneficiary. Here, MERS is "the person named or otherwise
designated in [Edwards'] trust deed as the person for whose benefit the trust deed is given." The
deed of trust expressly states that "MERS is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument"
(R.124 - Ex. A at p. 1 (emphasis added)), and that "the beneficiary of this Security Instrument is
MERS" (id. at p. 2.) MERS serves a beneficiary and holder of record legal title to the security

instrument in its representative agency capacity on behalf of the owner of the note. (Id. at pp. 13.) The deed of trust explicitly confers upon MERS the "the right[] to exercise any or all of

[Lender's] interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property;
and to take any action required of Lender, including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling
this Security Instrument." (Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added).)
"Benefit" is very broad and malleable word, see Webster's New International Dictionary
203 (3d ed. 2002),10 and MERS clearly receives "benefit" from the trust deed even though
MERS did not lend the money and ultimately does not have the right to receive repayment. The
trust deed gives MERS a real "benefit" as holder of record legal title to the security instrument
on behalf of the lender, with the delegated authority to take all necessary actions for the lender,
including collecting payments and foreclosing. Indeed, as the beneficiary of record, MERS has
the exclusive authority to direct the trustee to foreclose (unless and until it assigns away the deed
of trust). As a matter of practice, MERS does not normally collect payments and no longer
permits foreclosures in its own name (instead, MERS normally assigns the trust deed to the
current note holder/owner or servicer who then directs the foreclosure in its name). But these

10 Statutory construction principles permit resort to common dictionary usage to arrive at plain
meaning of terms. See, e.g., Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 104 P.3d 946,909 (Idaho 2004).
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business practices do not negate the fact that MERS has these contractual rights under the deed
of trust.
Idaho courts court have held that MERS may serve as a proper beneficiary under a deed
of trust. See Hobson, 2012 WL 505917, at *4-5 (dismissing claim that MERS was not a proper
beneficiary under I.C. § 45-1502); Sprouse, supra, slip op. at 7-9 (same). This is not surprising,
given that the designation of MERS as the deed of trust beneficiary not only satisfies the statute,
it fully comports with established contract law principles. In Idaho, as in every jurisdiction,
"[t]he courts, both at law and in equity, must respect the provisions of a contract lawfully agreed
to." Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 340 P.2d 103, 107 (Idaho 1959). And, as the Ninth
Circuit recognized, plaintiffs "agreed to the terms [of trust deed] and were on notice" that MERS
was beneficiary. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1042.
MERS status as beneficiary also fits with basic agency law principles. Indeed, the use of
an agent or "nominee," which means "one designated to act for another as his representative in a
rather limited sense," Schuh Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 1938), "has long
been sanctioned as a legitimate practice" in real estate, where owners frequently confer rights on
a "nominee" or "agent" for a variety of purposes, including to execute or hold security
instruments. In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23,30 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing cases); see also In re
Childs Co., 163 F.2d 379,382 (2d Cir. 1947); Barkhausen v. Cant'! Ill. Nat 'I Bank, 120N.E.2d
649, 655 (Ill. 1954). The Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) confirms that agents may
enforce a mortgage on behalf of a lender, even instructing courts to "be vigorous in seeking to
find such [an agency] relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the
mortgagor and the frustration of [the lender's] expectation of security." Id. § 5.4, cmt. e (1997);

52114402.2

- 26-

see also id. § 5.4(c) ("mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is
entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures") (emphasis added). 11
Recognizing that MERS properly may serve as beneficiary under Idaho law, Edwards
argues that MERS is not a proper beneficiary here because MERS is also impermissibly acting as
trustee. (Appellant's Bf. at 31-32.) Edwards notes that "beneficiary" is defined as a person who
"shall not be the trustee" and that "trustee" is defined as "a person to whom the legal title to real
property is conveyed by trust deed." (Id. at 31.) She then points to the deed of trust language that
"MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by borrower in this Security Instrument."
(R.124 - Ex. A at p. 3.) She claims that this "legal title" language means that MERS is acting as
trustee and therefore MERS cannot also be the beneficiary. (Appellant's Bf. at 32.) Once again,
Edwards' argument is incorrect. The deed of trust plainly and unambiguously names Alliance
(who has now been replaced by Pioneer) as "trustee" and provides that "Borrower irrevocably

grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the [Property] ... " (R.124 - Ex. A at
p. 3.)

The "legal title" language relied upon by Edwards merely describes the agency

relationship between the note owner and MERS, giving MERS legal title to the security
instrument, not title to the real property.
Indeed, on this grounds, Idaho trial courts have correctly rejected this same "trustee"
argument. For example, in Payne v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. CV-2011-451, slip op. at 7-8
(Jefferson County D. Ct. Nov. 15,2011) (Attachment D), the court held that, reading the Deed of
Trust as a whole, "it unmistakably defines Alliance Title as the trustee, and there is no

See also MIL TON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON CONTRACTS & CONVEYANCES OF REAL
PROPERTY, chapter 6, § 6: 1:5 Nominees ("[I]t is familiar practice in real estate transactions to use
a nominee. ").
II
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reasonable interpretation of the Deed of Trust that would make MERS a trustee." (Emphasis
added). The court explained:
[The "legal title" language in the Deed of Trust] does nothing more
than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust as nominee
for the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS, as
nominee for the lender, power to act on behalf of the lender to
foreclose and sell the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus,
the language referring to legal interest held by MERS defines the
agency relationship between the lender and MERS.... Even
considering the provision in isolation, this Court does not believe
the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a legal interest in real
property ....
Id. at 7-8 (Jefferson County D. Ct. Nov. 15,2011); accord Gordon, supra, slip op. at 15 (holding

that deed of trust, when read as a whole, does not provide that MERS is acting as trustee, and
selectively reading isolated language to the contrary would thwart the mutual intent of the
parties, while allowing borrower to "shirk his responsibility"). This Court also should reject
Edwards' meritless "trustee" argument.
Edwards also makes the confusing argument that there was an improper "assignment of
Deed of Trust." (Appellant's Br. at 9.) But the deed of trust has never been assigned. MERS
has been the beneficiary since the deed of trust was first recorded in the land records. To the
extent Edwards is really claiming that her note was transferred, that claim appears to be based on
the mistaken assumption that her loan was transferred from Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, to
Aurora Bank, FSB. In fact, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, merely changed its name to Aurora
Bank, FSB. There is no allegation or evidence that the note was transferred.
In any event, contrary to Edwards' assertions, MERS's authority under the deed of
trust-which expressly includes the right to foreclose or cancel the deed of trust-certainly
includes the authority to assign its beneficiary interest if and when MERS chooses to do so. In
Trotter, this Court declined to decide whether MERS had authority to assign the deed of trust
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because the deed of trust was not in the appellate record.

The Trotter court did, however,

"presume that the deed of trust supports the district court's findings that MERS could assign its
interests." 275 P.3d 857, at *6. Trotter specifically rejected that the two bankruptcy decisions
support "the assertion that under Idaho law, MERS could not assign the deed of trust." Id; see
also Sprouse, supra, at 8-10 (nothing under Idaho law prohibits MERS from assigning its interest

in deed of trust to the note owner who then begins foreclosure); Hobson, 2012 WL 505917 at *4
(MERS has authority to assign deed of trust).
C.

The Note and Deed of Trust Were Not Impermissibly Split

In another twist on her "show me the note" premise, Edwards argues that the sale or
securitization of her note and/or MERS' role as deed of trust beneficiary impermissibly
"separated" the note from the deed of trust, rendering the note unsecured and the deed of trust
"unenforceable." (Appellant's Br. at 25.) According to Edwards, the "note and deed of trust
must be held by the same owner in order to be enforceable." (ld.) Again, this "show me the
note" theory was rejected in, and cannot survive, Trotter. See Russell, 2012 WL 442903, at *1
(reading Trotter as precluding claim that no party had standing to foreclosure because no party
owned both the deed of trust and note which were split as a result of securitization).
In any event, there was no separation between the note and the deed of trust in this case.
As noted above, there is no evidence that Edwards' note was ever securitized or sold by the
original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, nlk/a Aurora Bank, FSB. But even if the note was
sold or securitized, there was no legal separation of the note and deed of trust.

Edwards

argument ignores the indisputable fact that MERS was party to the original loan transaction and
that note and deed of trust were executed contemporaneously as part of that single transaction.
Thus, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, the note and deed of trust were "not irreparably split"
because at all times MERS remained the agent of the lender and its successors and assigns.
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Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1044; accord Us. Bank v. Howie, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2053575, at *9
(Kan. Ct. App. June 8, 2012) ("Because MERS was acting as an agent of [the lender], the
Mortgage and the Note were never severed .... ").
Numerous courts in Idaho and around the country likewise have rejected this Edwards'
"split" argument:

Horvath v. Bank ofN.Y., N.A., 641 F.3d 617,624 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) ("If
[plaintiff] were correct [] that the transfer of a note splits it from the deed of trust
[naming MERS as beneficiary], there would be little reason for notes to exist in the
first place. One of the defining features of notes is their transferability, but on
[plaintiffs] view, transferring a note would strip it from the security that gives it
value and render the note largely worthless. This cannot be-and is not-the law.")
(citations omitted).
Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., --F.3d ----, 2011 WL 6739431, at *6 (lOth Cir. Dec. 23, 2011) (holding that general
principle that security follows the debt does not "prohibit[] the original parties to the
Note and Deed of Trust from agreeing to have someone other than the beneficial
owner of the debt act on behalf of that owner and its successors and assigns to enforce
rights granted in the trust deed").
Wade v Meridias Capital, Inc., No.2: 1O-cv-998-DS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28414, at
*6-7 (D. Utah Mar. 17,2011) ('''split the note' theory has been heavily litigated in
this district and in multiple other districts and has been rejected repeatedly").
In re MERS Litig., MOL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189, at *3-4 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011) ("[T]he alleged falsity in this claim arises from the fundamental
argument that the MERS recordation process splits the note from the deed of trust and
renders the note unenforceable. However, as discussed above, this Court does not find
legal support for the proposition that the MERS system of securitization is so
inherently defective so as to render every MERS deed of trust completely
unenforceable and unassignable.").
Meyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:1O-CV-00632-EJL-REB, 2011 WL 4584762, at *3
(D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2011) (collecting supporting authority and holding that "the
securitization of the loan did not extinguish the security interest in the real property").
Sprouse, supra, slip op. at 10-13 (dismissing claim that securitization or role of MERS
as beneficiary splits note from deed of trust rendering the deed of trust
unenforceable ).
For the same reasons, this Court should reject this tired "split" argument, too.
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D.

The Overwhelming Majority of Courts in Other Jurisdictions Also Have
Rejected Edwards' Theories

Given the dispositive force of this Court's apposite decision in Trotter, case law from
other jurisdictions is not particularly meaningful to the resolution of this appeal. But this Court
can take solace in that Trotter does not stand alone. The correctness in this Court's analysis is
confirmed by the numerous decisions around the country rejecting defaulting borrower claims
that MERS is not a proper beneficiary or that the involvement of MERS somehow destroys
standing to foreclose or separates the note from the deed of trust rendering the note unsecured
and the security instrument unenforceable. In addition to the cases cited in Section ILC, supra,
the following are just examples from the growing collection of cases far too numerous to cite:

Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1042, 1044 (affirming dismissal of claims that MERS's role as
beneficiary was a "sham" and split the deed of trust from the note rendering the loan
unsecured).
Kiah v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No 11-1010 (1st Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) Gudgment
affirming and attaching district court's order dismissing claims that MERS could not
assign the mortgage because MERS did not have an interest in the note) (Attachment
E).

Ferguson v. Avelo Mortg., LLC, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1618,1626-27 (2011) (holding that
MERS, as beneficiary under the deed of trust, was entitled to initiate foreclosure
despite not owning the note).
Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011) (rejecting claim
that MERS was not proper mortgagee because it lacked ownership interest in the
note).
Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 263 P.3d
397, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting theory that MERS role as beneficiary
"splits" deed of trust from note rendering the loan unsecured).
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 500-501 (Minn.
2009) (concluding that holder of record legal title to mortgage can foreclose even
without an ownership in the note).
Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 288 F. App'x 571, 572 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that under the terms of the mortgages, MERS has the authority to initiate
foreclosure actions).
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Wiley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 3:11-CV-1241-B, 2012 WL 1945614, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
May 30, 2012) (dismissing as invalid under Texas law "show-me-the-note" and
"split" theories challenging MERS assignment of deed of trust to servicer who then
initiated foreclosure for note owner).
In re MERS Litig., MOL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2012 WL 1906503, at *3-4 (D.
Ariz. May 25, 2012) ("Plaintiff does not cite to any authority in Hawaii, nor is the
Court aware of any such authority, that requires that MERS prove 'standing,' through
the production of a promissory note or otherwise, before it could initiate non-judicial
foreclosure .... ").
Hien Phan v. Bank oIN.Y., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 1222572, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr.
10, 2012) (rejecting as a recast "show me the note theory" borrower claim that MERS
could not assign deed of trust without establishing note owner's permission).
Welk v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, --- F. Supp. 2d ----,2012 WL 1035433, at *4 (D. Minn.
Mar. 29, 2012) (stating that '''show-me-the-note' argument ... has been rejected by
every federal and state court that has considered it under Minnesota law .... ").
In re MERS Litig., MDL Docket No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189, at *3-4 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011) (dismissing claims that, under Arizona, California, Neveda, and
Oregon law, MERS is not true beneficiary and thus cannot foreclose under deeds of
trust).
Croce v. Trinity Mortg. Assur. Corp., NO. 208CV01612 KJD PAL, 2009 WL 3172119,
*3 (D. Nev. Sep 28, 2009) ("Plaintiffs have cited no authority that is controlling upon
this Court that holds that MERS cannot have standing as a nominee beneficiary in
connection with a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding under Nevada law. This Court
has previously determined that MERS does have such standing. Courts around the
country have held the same.) (citations omitted).
The district court's decision below is correct and should be affirmed.
E.

Alternative Grounds, Not Relied Upon by the District Court, Provide
Independent Bases for Affirmance

The district court's decision below may be affirmed on any ground, not just those
grounds relied upon by the district court in granting summary judgment to respondents. See

Lattin v. Adams County, 236 P.3d 1257, 1264 n.7 (2010). Here, several independent grounds
raised by respondents below, but not relied upon by the district court in dismissing Edwards'
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complaint, provide independent, alternative grounds for affirmance of the district court's
decision.
1.

Edwards' Claims Are Equitable and Are Barred by Her Failure to
Allege Ability to Cure Her Default

As respondents argued below (R.126), Edwards' claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief to stop an allegedly wrongful foreclosure are equitable in nature, and those claims fail
unless Edwards pleads (and ultimately proves) she can repay or at least reinstate her loan. It is
well settled that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are generally based in equity. See
Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, No. CV 2002 3890, 2002 WL 32129530, at *12 n.5 (Kootenai

County Dist. Ct. Nov. 30, 2002) ("[a]n injunction is an equitable remedy issued under
established principles that guide courts of equity") (citing Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936

F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Idaho 1996));

Wood v. Yordy, No. 1:07-cv-00350-EJL, 2012 WL

1252989, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2012) (noting that "declaratory judgment" is a "form[] of
equitable relief') (citing Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948)).
It is equally well settled that those who seek equity "must be required to do equity."
Haener v. Albro, 249 P.2d 919, 925 (Idaho 1952). Under Idaho law, this means that a party

cannot claim that a contract is invalid while continuing to reap the contract's benefits. See, e.g.,
id. at 260 ("Appellants ask full performance by respondents. By the same token, respondents are

in equity entitled to full performance by appellants of all their obligations."); Quayle v. Stone,
251 P. 630, 630 (Idaho 1926) ("[H]aving enjoyed the benefits of the lease, the tenant cannot use
the statute to defeat the payment of the balance of the rent which he agreed to pay."). This
equitable principle applies fully to mortgage instruments. See Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank,
161 P. 90, 93 (Idaho 1916) (equity requires a plaintiff to offer to satisfy the debt in exchange for
the property); MacHold v. Farnan, 117 P. 408,410 (Idaho 1911) (same).
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Taken together, the foregoing bedrock legal principles stand for the proposition that there
are no "free houses" just as there are no "free lunches." In other words, a defaulting borrower
who comes to the court in equity seeking to stop foreclosure must do equity herself by pleading
(and ultimately proving) the ability cure the default or payback the money. See, e.g., Gordon,
supra, slip op. at 11 (borrower's failure to to tender loan proceeds required dismissal of quiet
title claim predicated on theory that foreclosure was wrongful because MERS was not proper
beneficiary) (citing Trusty v. Ray, 249 P .2d 814, 817 (Idaho 1952». See also Hogan v. NW Trust
Servs., Inc., No. 10-6028-HO, 2010 WL 1872945, at *5 (D. Or. May 7, 2010) ("plaintiffs [do
not] deny that they are in default on their loans [and do not] offer anything to indicate that they
were able to tender the debt in order to disrupt the non-judicial foreclosure"), aff'd, 2011 WL
2601563, 441 F. App'x 490 (9th Cir. July 1, 2011); White v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,
No. 3:09-CV-2484-G, 2010 WL 4352711, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2010) ("to the extent
[plaintiff! seeks equitable relief to avoid foreclosure, he cannot state a claim for such relief
because he has not tendered the amount due on the loan"); see also Keen v. Am. Home Mortg.
Servicing, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (plaintiff failed to allege "any facts
supporting her ability to tender any payment" and "an immediate ability or willingness to tender
payment"). In sum, it makes no sense to stop an allegedly wrongful foreclosure if the defaulted
borrower cannot cure because the inability to cure means foreclosure is an unfortunate
eventuality.
Here, of course, Edwards has not plead (much less presented any evidence that she might
be able to prove) that she can cure her default. On the contrary, she has lived in the Property
since August 2009 without making so much as a single loan payment.
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Under these

circumstances, her equitable claims fail based on her own failure to do equity, which provides an
alternative, independent grounds for affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint.

2.

Edwards Failed to Plead Any Fraud Claim with the Requisite
Particularity Required by Idaho R. Civ. P. 9(b)

In her amended (and initial) complaint, Edwards asserted only two purported causes of
action: (1) temporary and permanent injunction (Count I); and (2) declaratory judgment (Count
II). (R.8-18; see also R.8-13.) Also woven throughout her amended complaint, however, are
conclusory and speculative purported factual allegations of "fraud" and "fraudulent" conduct,
apparently as supposed justification for the requested injunctive and declaratory relief. (RA-6.)
As respondents pointed out to the district court (R.I26), Edwards' fraud allegations do not even
satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Idaho R. Civ. P. 8(a), much less Rule 9(b)'s
heightened pleading requirement that fraud be plead with particularity. See Dengler v. Hazel

Blessinger Family Trust, 106 P.3d 449, 453 (Idaho 2005) ("Fraud claims must be pled with
particularity").
Under Idaho law, to prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish everyone of the following
nine elements:
"(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge about its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5)
his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearers ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance on the [representation]; (8) his rights to rely
thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury."

Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 386 (Idaho 2005) (quoting Witt v. Jones, 722 P.2d
474, 477 (Idaho 1986)). In order to satisfy Rule 9(b), "'[t]he party alleging fraud must support

the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with
particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud.'" Id. at 386 (emphasis added)
(quoting Estes v. Barry, 967 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1998)); see, e.g., Dengler, 106 P.3d at 453
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(affirming dismissal of fraud claim because "utterly general averments" without any particular
allegations regarding "representations, falsity, materiality, intent, reliance or injury based on
representations" fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)); Jenkins, 108 P.3d at 386-87 (affirming dismissal for
failure to plead fraud with particularity where complaint only "generally alleged ... several ...
false statements").
Here, the amended complaint contains nothing more than conclusory and speculative
allegations of generalized "fraud" or "fraudulent" activities of respondents.

There are no

particularized allegations whatsoever as to any, much less all nine of the elements of a fraud
claim. The amended complaint does not even name the elements of fraud. For similar reasons, in
Cervantes the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a borrower's analogous fraud theory. See 656

F.3d at 1034 (noting that the borrowers' fraud allegations did not indicated that they "were
misinformed about MERS's role as a beneficiary," that they "relied on any misrepresentations
about MERS in deciding to enter into their home loans," or that "the designation of MERS as
beneficiary caused them any injury"). Similarly, here, Edwards' amended complaint failed by
wide margin to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, which provides independent
grounds for affirming the district court's dismissal below.
F.

Edwards' Meritless "Bankruptcy," "Substitute Trustee," and "Insurance Set
orr' Theories Should be Deemed Abandoned

In her amended complaint (R.104, R.106, R.112), and in her arguments to the district
court below, Edwards contended that the foreclosure could not go forward because: (1) her
original lender, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, was in bankruptcy; (2) there had been an improper
substitution of trustee involving MERS, Alliance, and American Gold Mortgage Corporation,
Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company; and (3) the loan
was securitized and was insured against default such that the note owner was paid in full.
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Because Edwards has not continued with these theories on appeal, they should be deemed
abandoned. See generally State v. Prestwich, 783 P.2d 298,300 (Idaho 1989) (citations omitted)
("This Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the failure of the appellant to include an
issue in the statement of issues required by LA.R. 35(a)( 4) will eliminate the consideration of
that issue in the appeal."), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).
Even if not abandoned, Edwards' bankruptcy, trustee substitution, and insurance set off
theories are at best completely meritless, at worst blatantly frivolous, and provide no basis
whatsoever for reversal of the district court. As the district court correctly recognized, based on
judicial notice of public records of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York and the Federal Reserve Board, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. filed for
bankruptcy. (R.161; R.124 - Ex. F.) On the other hand, Edwards' lender, Lehman Brothers
Bank, FSB, changed its name to Aurora Bank, FSB, and has never filed bankruptcy. (R.161 ;
R.124 - Exs. G & 1.) Similarly, as the district court concluded, based on judicial notice of public
records from Kootenai County, the alleged improper substitution of trustee related to another
loan-Edwards' prior loan that was paid off-which has nothing to do with the loan at issue in
this lawsuit. (R.157, 162; R. R.124 - Exs. J, K, & L.) Finally, the district court correctly
concluded that Edwards had "failed to provide any evidence to support the[] allegations" relating
to insurance or set off. (R.163.) In sum, Edwards' questionable theories regarding bankruptcy
and improper trustee substitution provide absolutely no grounds for reversal of the decision of
the district court.

G.

Edwards' (Incorrect) Position, If Accepted, Would Have a Devastating
Impact on Idaho's Residential Mortgage Industry

Lastly, it should not be lost on this Court that if it were to accept Edward's insupportable
arguments that respondents lack standing to pursue non-judicial foreclosure against borrowers
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who, like Edwards, are in undeniable and irreconcilable default, there would be adverse
consequences for Idaho beyond just Edwards' loan.

It is well documented that there are

approximately 3,000 MERS members,12 with tens of millions of MERS' security instruments
(mortgages and deeds of trust) nationwide currently registered on the MERS system, and more
than half of all new residential loan originations involve MERS. See Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL 3647125, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009)

(noting that there were 60 million MERS mortgages and deeds of trust on MERS system);
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 491-92 (noting that approximately two-thirds of all new residential

mortgage loans involve MERS security instruments). It is equally well known that residential
mortgage loans are commonly sold on the secondary mortgage loan market after closing. See
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1038; Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. Thus, there are undoubtedly many

such MERS loans in Idaho. Yet, if Edwards' position regarding MERS lack of standing were
correct, most if not all of these MERS loans in Idaho would be subject to challenge.
Edwards not only challenges MERS authority or "standing" to foreclose, she seemingly
challenges MERS' authority to take any action, such as assigning the deed of trust, and
presumably even recording a reconveyance or satisfaction when the loan is paid off. If Edwards
were correct, every time an Idaho borrower with a MERS deed of trust defaulted, the borrower
could challenge the foreclosure for lack of standing on the grounds that the promissory note is
unsecured and deed of trust is unenforceable because different parties hold the note and deed of
trust. This would undoubtedly increase the number of foreclosure lawsuits currently pending
before Idaho courts, and would likely even cause some number of performing borrowers to
consider intentionally defaulting on their loans in hopes of avoiding altogether the obligation to

12

See supra n.6.
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repay the money they borrowed.

County recorders would also be deluged with attempts to

transfer beneficiary status out of the name of MERS and into the lender holding the promissory
note.
But that is not all. Edwards' position, if accepted, would affect subsequent bona fide
purchasers who now own and live in a property where MERS was involved in the foreclosure or
even a reconveyance at payoff. As to foreclosures that have already taken place, numerous
foreclosed parties would undoubtedly commence lawsuits seeking to set aside the foreclosures.
In such instances, it arguably would require the unwinding of the entire foreclosure process as
well as the subsequent loan transaction between the bona fide purchasers and their lenders, and
reverting title to the property back to someone who lost it solely because they failed to honor
their loan obligations. Further, the tens of thousands of reconveyances and releases of lien that
MERS has executed on behalf of lenders for borrowers who honored their obligations would be
subject to challenge. This would include, for example, the reconveyance issued in connection
with Edwards' prior loan with American Gold Mortgage Corporation. (D.124 - Ex. K.) Taking
Edwards' position to its logical extreme, that reconveyance was never effective, and her prior
loan was thus never satisfied of record.
All of this would increase litigation and recording errors and delays, unnecessary clouds
on title, and ultimately make residential mortgage loans more expensive and less available for
Idaho citizens. This is not hyperbole. This Court need look no further than Michigan as a real
world example of what would be likely to occur in Idaho if the Edwards' view were adopted
here. In Michigan, the state's intermediate appellate court reached an anomalous conclusion that
MERS could not foreclosure because it held no interest in the promissory note. Not surprisingly,
the court of appeal's fundamentally incorrect decision was quickly reversed by the Michigan
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supreme court. See Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183,183-84 (Mich. 2011).
But for six months before that reversal, there was confusion and market illiquidity in Michigan
(e.g., title insurers stopped insuring properties making it difficult to obtain mortgage loans),13

and widespread litigation challenging completed foreclosures, including 11 class actions. 14 This
Court should not allow this same scenario to play out in Idaho. As was eventually acknowledged
in Michigan, MERS is a valid beneficiary (and mortgagee) and MERS deeds of trust (and
mortgages) are legally enforceable.

As shown above, nothing in Idaho law supports the

Edward's position that MERS lacks standing to foreclose on behalf of the lender on whose
behalf MERS is acting as beneficiary. To avoid the foregoing unnecessary problems in Idaho,
the district court's decision below should be affirmed.

IV.

MERS, NOT EDWARDS, IS ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS
Contrary to Edwards' assertions, MERS, not Edwards, are entitled to their fees and costs

under I.A.R. 40 and 41. Edwards' claims lack any merit whatsoever and appear to have been
brought without proper investigation and then continued in the face of indisputable public
records that contradict her claims.

J3 Cami Reister, Home sales stay steady; But just for June, closed deals were 20% lower than a
year ago, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (July 14, 2011) (MERS' Addendum at 5); Nick Tirimaos &
Ruth Simon, Effort on Home Loans Stalls, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 19,2011) (MERS'
Addendum at 7.)

Banacki v. One West Bank, FSB, No.ll-cv-11864, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119906, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 18,2011).
14
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's decision below should be affinned in all
respects.
Dated: July 10,2012

Derric
'11, ISB No. 4021
Brian Langford, ISB No. 7747
Routh Crabtree Olsen P.S.
300 Main Street, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83702
(208.489.3035)
Robert J. Pratte, pro hac vice application
pending
Brent R. Lindahl, pro hac vice application
pending
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
80 South 8th Street, Suite 2100 Minneapolis,
MN 55402
(612.321.2244)
Attorneys for Respondents Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

52114402.2

- 41 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESLIE JENSEN-EDWARDS,
Appellant,
vs.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. AS NOMINEE and
BENEFICIARY and QUALITY LOAN SERVICES, AS ATTORNEY IN FACT AND
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; and PIONEER LENDER TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC AS
TRUSTEE,
Respondents.

ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENTS' OPENING BRIEF

Case Number 38604-2011
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County.
Appeal from the Honorable Lansing Haynes, District Judge, presiding.

Leslie Jensen-Edwards
2600 E. Seltice Way
Suite 144
Post Falls, ID 83854
Appellant in Pro Per

Derrick J. O'Neill, ISB No. 4021
Brian Langford, ISB No. 7747
Routh Crabtree Olsen P.S.
300 Main Street, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83702
(208.489.3035)
Robert J. Pratte, pro hac vice
application pending
Brent R. Lindahl, pro hac vice
application pending
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
80 South 8th Street, Suite 2100
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612.321.2244)
Attorneys for Respondents Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

Holger Uhl, Esq.
McCarthy & Holthus LLP
8995 SW Miley Road
Suite 103
Wilsonville, OR 97070
Attorney for Quality Loan
Service Corporation and
Pioneer Lender Trustee
Services LLC

Sprouse v. Mortgage Electronic
slip op. (Kootenai County Dist.

Mortensen v. ACE Mortgage
(Ada Cty Dist. Ct. March 26, 201

Gordon v. Fed. Nat 'I Mortg. Ass
(Bingham County Dist. Ct. Feb. 17,

Payne v. Chase Home Fin., LLC,
(Jefferson County D. Ct. Nov. 1
Kiah v. Aurora Loan Servs.,

52118197.1

.................................... A

........... B

................................ C

............. D
......... E

Apr, 1', 2012

1:28)M

Mi che]1, Haynes, FtiedlarJef, ete

2012 APR II PM I: 2 f
CLEKK DISTRICT COURT
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

JOHN SPROUSE,

)

) CASE NO, CV-1l-4920
Plaintiff,

)

) MEMORANDUM DECISION
) AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS
) MOTION TO DISMISS

vs,
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc, (MERS)
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

-------------------------)
John Sprouse, Pro Se, Plaintiff
Matthew McGee, MOFFATI. THOMAS. BARRETI. ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD., for
Defendant

1. Factual and Procedural History

On August 25, 2006, Plaintiff John Sprouse C1Sprouse") executed a Promissory
Note in favor of First Guaranty MOlt gage Corporation for the purchase of real property

commonly described as 5178 East Portside Court, Post Falls, Kootenai County, Idaho
(the "Subject Property"), The Note provided that Sprouse agreed to pay First Guaranty
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Mortgage Corporationl as Lender, $227,950,00 plus interest for the Subject Property,
Amended Complaint, Ex. B at p. 2.

Also on August 25, 2006, Sprouse executed a Deed of Trust to serve as security
for the payment obligation reflected in the Note. The Deed of Trust was recorded in the
Kootenai County Recordees Office on August 29, 2006, as Instrument No. 2052344000.
Amended Complaint, Ex. B.

The Deed of Trust provided that Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (CCMERS") was the nominee beneficiary for Lender First Guaranty and its
successors and assigns, Id ar p. 2. The Deed of Trust also provided that if Sprouse
breached any covenant or agreement contained in the Deed of Trust, the Propelty may be
sold. Id. at pp. 12-13,

~~ 201 22.

On January 4, 2011, MERS executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust, wherein
MERS transferred all beneficial interest under the August 25,2006, Deed of Trust to U.s,
Bank National Association as Trustee for RAMP 2006RZ5 ("U.S. Bank"). alorig with the
Promissory Note.

The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded in the Kootenai

County Recorder's Office on January 12, 2011, as Instrument No. 2298763000.
Amended Complaint, Ex. A.

On June 17) 2011, Sprouse :filed his Verified Complaint

fOf

Quiet Title and

Declaratory Judgment, along with a Memorandum of Law, On July 14, 2011, MERS
filed a Notice of Appearance. On July

15, 2011) Sprouse filed a Motion for Default

Judgment. On July 18,201 C MERS filed its Response in Opposition to the Motion for
Entry of Default Judgment, along with a Motion for a Motion for Definite Statement. On
July 20, 20ll} this Court entered its Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default
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Judgment, wherein it denied Sprouse's motion finding that MERS had appeared in the
action.
On August 1,2011, MERS's Motion for Definite Statement came on for hearing
and Sprouse agreed to file an Amended Complaint that comported with the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure. On August 10, 2011, Sprouse filed his Amended Verified Compliant
for Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment. On August 24,2011, MERS filed its Motion
to Dismiss, pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), along with a Memorandum in Support. On
October 13,2011, Sprouse filed his Response Brief.! On October 13,2011, MERS flled
its Reply Brief.
,

On October 14,2011, MERS Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing and this
COUrt

raised the issue of Trotter v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, ef al.•2 which had recently

been fully argued to the Idaho Supreme Court. The parties agreed to stay the proceedings
in the instant action pending a decision in the Trotter matter, and this Court entered its
Order for Stay of Proceedings on October 17. 2011.
On March 30, 2012, Sprouse filed an Amended Response Brief. On April 41
2012, MERS filed a Reply to Sprouseis Amended R£sponse Brief. On April 6; 2012,

MERS's Motion to Dismiss came On for hearing, and this Court took the matter under
advisement.

It Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant t~ I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court
determines the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of his claim. Gallagher v

I Sprouse has attached documents to his opposition and Amended opposition briefs, which this Court has
lli!l considered as part of its present decision. This Court is only considering the Amended Complaint in
the matter and the two exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint that are incorporated into the pleading.
2 TrolTerv. Bank ofNew York Mellon, el af., ...PJd•••; 2012 WL 975493 (Idaho March 23, 2012).
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State; 141 Idaho 665; 667 i 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005).

In detelmining whether a

complaint adequately states a cause of action, every reasonable intendment will be made
to sustain it. Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P,2d
281 (1948) (citations omitted), A motion under this section admits the tl1lth of the facts
alleged; and all intendments and inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom~ and

such will be considered in light most favorable to the plaintift~ Walenta v. Mark Means
Co., 87 Idaho 543, 394 P.2d 329 (1964). A motion to dismiss may be granted for failure

to state a claim if it is absolutely clear that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts which
would support any relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346 (Ct. App.
1992). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party
is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (2004) (citation omitted). The only facts that a court
may consider on a motion to dismiss for failure 'In state a claim are those appearing in the
complaint, along with any facts that are the proper subject of judicial notice because they
are facts of conunon knowledge which controvert avennents of the complaint,
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,275,796 P.2d ISO, 152 (Ct. App. 1990).

III. Analysis
In his Amended Complaint, Sprouse asserts that MERS is not a lawful beneficiary

under the Deed of Trust according to "two recent Federal rulings regarding [MERS] as
being an invalid' party on the Deed of Trust,,3 and pursuant to 1. C. §45-1502. Amended
Complaint at p. 2,

~

1. Further, Sprouse alleges,

[T]he true and beneficial owner of the promissory note that
is associated with the Deed of Trust in this action is
, Sprouse cites the Court to In re Wilhelm, 401 B,R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) and In re Sheridan, No.
OS-203S1-lLM, 2009 WL 631355 (Bankr. D. Idaho Mar 12,2009).
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unknown and deliberately obfuscated, therefore clouding
title to the subject property, Therefore, it is the purpose of
this Quiet Title Action to compel any and all parties with
real interest in this subject property to present their valid
proof of claim, else release their claims.

Amended Complaint at p. 2,

~

1.

Essentially, in the Amended Complaint, Sprouse alleges that because MERS was
not a lawful beneficiary, it had no authority to assign its interests in the August 25,2006,
Deed of Trust and Promissory Note to U.S. Bank. Amended Complaint at p. 6,

~

19.

Further, Sprouse alleges that because MERS was not a lawful beneficiary, the assignment
of the Deed of Trust split the Promissory Note fi'om the Deed of Trust, which is
impermissible pursuant to Carpenter v. Longan. 83 U.S. 271 (1872). Fm1her, Sprouse
asserts that he does not know who currently owns the Promissory Note. Amended

Complaint at p. 6. ~~ 20 -22. AJ:, such. Sprouse prays that this COUlt IIcompel [MERS] to
identify the real owner of the promissory note '" [and] enter a declaratory judgment
ordering the Deed of Trust to be null and void.') ld at pp. 8-9, 1132.

A. Sprouse is Held to the Same Standards as a Licensed Attorney
In his Amended Complaint and Response blief, Sprouse El\'gues that a pro se
litigant should not be held to the same standard as a licensed attorney) and that a pro se
litigant's pleadings should be liberally construed to do substantial justice,

Further;

Sprouse asSet'ts that the Court should aid a pro se litigant with amending his pleading to
comport with the correct form. Amended Complaint at p. 3; Response to Defendant'S

Motton to Dismiss (IT p. 2.
In this Court's July 20, 2011, Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment. this Court provided that Sprouse was being held to the standards of a licensed
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attorney pursuant to the Idaho case law on the matter. The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that "[p]ro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because they are
representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules." In re
SRBA, 149 Idaho 532,237 P.3d 1 (2010). "Pro se litigants are held to the same standards

and mles as those represented by an attorney." Trotter, 2012 WL 975493, at *3 (citation
omitted).
B. The Quiet Title Demand Fails to State a Claim

MERS argues that it claims no interest in the August 25. 2006, Deed of Trust nor
the August 25, 2006. Promissory Note. and this is evidenced by the Assignment of Deed'
ofT11lst Therefore, no right, title or interest remains with MERS as nominee for First
Guaranty Mortgage Corporation, its successors and assigns. Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Dismiss at pp. 2 and 4.
Sprouse argues that the assignment was not valid because MERS was not a valid
beneficiary under I.C. § 45-1502(1).

Therefore, Sprouse argues, "it is [MERS's]

assignment action which leaves the interest in the Deed of Trust with [MERS], creates
the cloud on the title, and gives rise to this Quiet Title Action." Response Briefat p, 4.
I.e, § 6-401 provides, in pertinent part, that an action for quiet title may be

maintained in the following circumstances:

An action may be brought by any person against another
who elaims an estate 01' interest in real or personal propelty
adverse to him, for the purpose of detellnining such adverse
claim,
Idaho case law provides that Sprouse must show that he owns the property free of

the mOltgage in order to bring a claim to quiet title. In Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho
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219, 222, 220 PJd 575, 578 (2009)} the Idaho Supreme Court provided "to remove a

cloud on title, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that it has title to the subject
pl'opeliy free nom any encumbrance," In Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236, 249 P.2d
814, 817 (1952), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a mortgagor cannot quiet title against
a mortgagee without showing that he has paid or tendered payment of the debt.
Since the January 12,2011, Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded, MERS,

has not claimed any right, title or interest in the Subject Property. The Assignment shows
that U.S. Bank now has a beneficial interest in the Subject Property. Further, Sprouse has
failed to show that he has tendered full payment of his debt obligation in order to pl'oceed
on his quiet title action,
Therefore, Sprouse fails to state a claim for quiet title upon which relief may be
granted against MERS. As such, Sprouse's request that this Court quiet title in his favor

is denied, and MERS's Motion to Dismiss as to this claim is granted.
C. Sprouse's Claims for Declaratory Relief Fail to State a Claim

1. The Assignment of the Deed of Trust was Valid
Sprouse argues that the assignment of the Deed of TlUst was not valid because

MERS was not a valid beneficiary under I.e. § 45-1502(1), and courts within Idaho and
across the United States are challenging MERS role as a beneficiary in a Deed of Trust.

Response Brief at p. 4, Sprouse cites the Court to non~Idaho case law and two Idaho
bankruptcy

COUlt

decisions in support of his argument. to wit: In re Wilhelm. 407 B.R.

392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) and In re Sheridan, No. 08-20381-TLM, 2009 WL 631355
(BanIa-, D, Idaho Mar. 12,2009),
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed Shl'rfdan and Wilhelm in its Trottn decision,
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Those cases are related to standing in bankruptcy
proceedings and whether MERS met the statutory,
constitutional, and prudential requirements to bring a
motion in bankruptcy court. See Sheridan. 2009 WL
631355, at *4; Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398. Neither case
supports Trotter's assertion that under Idaho law, MERS
could not assign its interest in the deed oftl.1.lst.

Trotter, 2012 WL 975493, at *5.
I.e. § 45"1502(1) defines a beneficiary as ('the person named or otherwise
designated in a tI1lst deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his

successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee" (emphasis added).
The August 25, 2006, Deed of Trust provides:
"MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns.
MERS is the benefIciary under this Security Instrument.
Amended Complaint. Ex B at p. 2, ~ (E).

TRANSFER OF RlOIDS IN THE PROPERTY
The beneficiary of this Security Interest is MERS (solely as
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns)
and the successors and assigns of MERS. Amended
Complaint, Ex. B at p. 3.
Tills Court held in Trotter

11

Bank of New York Mellon (Kootenai County Case

No. CV-1O-95). that MERS could assign its interest in the Deed of Trust as a nominee
beneficiary. The Idaho Supreme Court providr,d that "[w]e therefore presume that the
deed of trust suppOlts the district court's finding that MERS could assign its interest to
Bank of New York ll4 Trotter, 2012 WL 975493. at *5.

Further. this CoUrt held in Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System,

Inc., et ai, (Kootenai County Case No. CV ~ 10-2745) that there was no statutory

Neither party provided our Supreme Court with the Deed of Trust, causing the Supreme Court to presume
that this Court's holding was not in error; however, the decision did not overrule this Court's conclusion.

4
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provision in Idaho's Deed of Trust Act, I.e. § 45-1502, et seq., that prevented the
beneficiary from assigning its interests in a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust to another
beneficial party. Specifically, this Court held that "the Note and Deed of Trust may be
sold One or more times without prior notice to the Borrower." Memorandum Decision

and Order (November 16, 2010) at p. 17.
I.C. § 45-1502(1) apparently allows for an assignment via the «(successor in
interest" language. Further, the Deed of Trust provides that MERS may transfer its
beneficial lights in the property.
This Court has also reviewed two recent U.S. District Court of Idaho decisions,
and finds them persuasive, although not binding, to wit: Russell v. OneWest Bank FSB,
2012 WL 442903 (D, Idaho Feb. 10,2012) and Hobson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012
WL 505917 (D. Idaho Feb. 15, 2012). In Hobson, Chief Judge Wimnill analyzed MERS
role as a legitimate beneficiary under the Idaho Deed of Trust Act, and concluded that

MERS was a beneficiary for the similar reasoning that this Court proVided in its Edwards
decision,s

The Hobson

COUlt

cited this

CoUICS

Trotter and Edwards decisions as

authority in reaching its conclusion, and provided that "[a]lthough the Trotter [the Idaho
Supreme Cow.t's decision] court did not directly decide the issue of MERS's authority,
the

COUlt

believes the Idaho Supreme Court would conclude in this case that :MERS had

authority to assign. a beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to Wells Fa1'go," Hobson at

Sprouse has not cited this Court to any binding or persuasive case law that leads
this Court to overturn its previous findings that MERS can assign its beneficial interests
cited to Ralph 1'. Met Life. Mindoka County District Court Case No. CV 2010-0200 (Aug. 10,
2011) for the proposition that MERS is merely a sham beneficiary. Sprouse also made this argument at the
April 6, 2012, hearing. This Court, like Judge Winmill, is unconvinced that MERS is a sham beneficiary.
5 Hobson
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in the Deed of Trust to another entity. Therefore, this Court finds that the Assignment of
Deed of Trust, wherein MERS assigned its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to U.S.
Bank, was valid.

2. The Note and Deed of Trust did not Split and Allegations of Unclear
Q,wnel"ship due to SecUlitizatjon fails to State a Claim

In his Amended Complaint, Sprouse asserts that the Deed of Trust has become
unenforceable because the Note and Deed of Trust were bifurcated or split at the time of
the initial loan and at the assigrunent to U.S. Bank. As such, Sprouse alleges, the Deed of
Trust is now unenforceable and defective. Amended Complaint at p. 7,

~

25. Sprouse

cites this Court to Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872) for the proposition that the
Note and the MOltgage are inseparable.
Sprouse also alleges that the Note has now been securitized and currently owned
by unknown shareholders, therefore, he does not know the true and beneficial owner of
the Note that is associated with the Deed of Trust. Amended Complaint at p. 2, ~ 1; p.B,
~

31.
MERS argues that Sprouse's allegations are known as the "split the note" theory,

and that this theory has repeatedly been rejected in COlllts throughout the country. MERS
cites the Court to In re MERS) 2011 WL 251453 (D. Ariz. Jan. 25,2011) (a multi-district
litigation) and Wade v. Meridlas Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 997161 (D. Utah March 17,
2011). Memorandum in Supporf af p. 6. A~ditionallYI MERS argues that Sprouse does

not allege any facts to suggest that U.S. Bank does not own the Note, regardless of
securitization. nor does he aJlege the he does not know to whom to make payments, or

that he has attempted to pay his loan and payment was refused or hnpropedy credited.
ld. afp. /0.
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The Idaho appellate comts have not yet addressed the split the note theory;
however, Idaho law provides for the transfer or assigmnent of loans. See I.C. & 28-3201. FUlther, Idaho law provides that the security follows the debt. See I.C. §§ 45-911

and 28-9-203(g).
The August 25. 2006, Deed of Trust specifically provides that the Note together
with the Deed of Trust can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Sprouse.

Amended Complaint, Ex. Bat p. 11, ~ 20.
Sprouse heavily relies on Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271. 83 U,S. 271, 274
(1872).

This Court has reviewed the case and finds that it doesn't aid Sprouse.

Carpenter is a U.S, Supreme Court appeal from the Colorado TeLTitory. and is not
binding on this Court. Additionally, the facts of the case concern a loan that had not yet
matured and not a home mortgage in default as is apparently the case here. Lastly,
numerous federal courts have reviewed Carpenter and found that it does not support a
split the note claim, One example is in Owens v. Recontrust Co., NA, 2011 WL 3684473
(D, Ariz. Aug. 23,2011). wherein the court provided:

Plaintiff alternatively argues that if she signed the Deed of
Trust on August 24, 2006, then it was not "togetherU with
the Promissory Note that is dated August 23, 2006, which
impelmissibly "separates" the Deed of Trust and the Note
('pursuant to Carpenter v. Longan (1872Y'. (Doc. 1-2, p.
1 I ,) This Court previously has rejected foreclosure
plaintiffs' attempts to 1'ely on Carpente.r v. Longan, 16
Wall. 271, 83 U.S. 271, 274, 21 L.Ed. 313 (l,872) for their
"impennissible separation" theory, See, e.g., Maxa v.
Countrywide Loans, Inc., 2010 WL 2836958 *4 (July 19,
2010). Plaintiff's separation of the Deed of Trust and
Promissory Note theory therefore fails to state a claim
for relief.

Id at *3 (emphasis added).
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This Court therefore finds that the Note and Deed of Trust in this matter have not
split at any time,

Fmther, this Court concludes that Sprouse's allegation that the

bifurcation has caused the Deed of Trust to become defective and unenforceable does not
state a claim of relief, because the Idaho appellate courts have not yet ruled on the issue

and tho fbdonu oourto thot haw uddro!)()od tho iO!luO have found rejeoted the theory.
Although not binding on this Court, the U.S. Disu'ict COUlt of Idaho has recently
addressed the

"securltization'~

argument in Meyer v. Bank of America, N.A., 2011 WL

4584762 (D. Idaho Sep. 30.2011), and this Court finds the Meyer decision persuasive. In

Meyer, the court held "[t]he Court finds the securitization of the loan did not extinguish
the security interest in the real property." ld at *3. The Meyer court then went on to cite

to numerous other federal COurts that came to the same conclusion.
Further, courts in Idaho~s First Judicial District, have held that securitization of a
promissory note does not state a valid claim for relief. See McMullen v. JP Morgan

Chase Bank, et aL, Kootenai County Case No. CVll-3431. Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting in- Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (February 6,
2012) (wherein District Judge Benjamin Simpson held that plaintiff cited no authotity

supporting his securitization conclusion and dismissed the securitization cause of action
finding that "whether or not the loan was securitized does nothing to effect Plaintiff's
obligations under the notell).
In the present case, Sprouse has not cited this Court to any authoritY that supports
his allegation that because the Note was securitized U.S. Bank. does not own the Note.
The Assignment of Deed of Trust provides that MERS. as a nominee beneficiary,
transferred its benefiCial interest in the Note and Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank Therefore,
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the allegation that Sprouse does not know who cU11'ently O\VIlS the Note does not set forth
a cognizable claim upon which this Court can grant relief.
Lastly. the present lawsuit is not an action to terminate a pending foreclosure
action. The parties have mentioned that nonMjudicial foreclosure proceedings under the
Idaho Deed of Trust Act have begun, but Sprouse has not made any allegations that the
non-judicial foreclosure is defective or the provisions of the Act are not being complied
with. He has not named U.S. Bank nor the trustee as a pmty to this action. In the
Amended Complaint, Sprouse does allege that ce11ain documents have not been filed in
the Kootenai County Recorder's Office, but he does not explain what those documents
are or how they ldate to a quiet title/declaratory judgment action. Further, he does not
allege that MERS, as the previous nominee beneficiary I has anything to do with those
documents or their alleged lack of recording.
Therefore. this Court concludes that Sprouse's allegations that the Promissory
Note and Deed of Trust split are not suppo11ed by the record, and even if the allegation
was supp0l1ed, the allegation fails to establish a cogni2:able claim. Additionally. the
securitization allegation also fails to set fo11h a valid claim. As such. Sprouse'g claims
for declaratory judgment are dismissed.
N. Conclusion and Order

Based upon the foregoing analysis, it appears beyond doubt that Sprouse can
prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. As such;
MERS's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
It appears to the Court that good cause for the entry of this Order has been shown;
now therefore,
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IT IS ORDERED that Sprouse's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted as to all causes of action asse11ed, and this case is hereby dismissed
with prejudice in IOto.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the lis pendens Sprouse has filed against the

Subject Property is hereby expunged.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MERS will prepare and submit to this Court a
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order.
DATED this.J.L day of April, 2012.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Page 14 of 15

M ~crel, Hayres, Fr edlader, PH.:

No.

75 Ld

J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of April 2012, a true and COllect copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, sent by interoffice mail, or faxed to:

John Sprouse
Pro Se
1601 N. Sepulveda Blvd., #631
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
Facsimile: 310-921-5673 ~1Matthew McGee
Moffatt, Thomas. Barrett, Rock & Fields
POBOX 829
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208-385-5384 ~f

Clifford T. Hayes
Clerk of the District COUll

/1A-t4~1~

By
Deputy 'Clerk
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1

IN TFfE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS"

2

THE 8TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ¥OR THE COUNTY 0

5

ERIC MORTENSEN,

6
7

Blaintiff,
VS.

ACE MORTGAGE FUNDING. LLC;
<1

10
11
12

STEWART TITLE CO.; MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS);
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS
SERVICING, LP aka BANK OF

13

14

YOHK.

17

Case No. CV-OC-2011-20448

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
STRIKE, GRANTING REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS

AMERICA CORP., N.A. aka BAC HOME
LOAN SERVICING, LP;
RECONTRUST; BANK OF NEW YORK

15

ADA

MELLON CORP., fka BANK OF NEW
Defendants.

This matter comes: before the Court on (1) Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration

HI

Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). Bank of America, N.A. for itself and as successor by merger to SAC

19

Horne Loans, LP, fka Countrywide Borne Loans Servicing. LP (erroneously sued as "Bank of

20

America Corp., N.A.") ("BANA"), Recol1Trust C<;>mpany, N.A. (erroneously sued as

21

"Reeonstrust") f'ReconTIuse'), aud The Bank of New York Menon fka The Dank of New Ymk,

22

as Trustee for Certificateholders, CWABS, Inc., Asset-hacked Certificates, Series 2007-BC3

23

(erroneously sued as "Bank of New York Mellon Corp., tka Bank of New York") (<<BONY")

24

(collectively, '''Defendants") Motion to Dismiss; (2) Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice; and
25
26
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1
2
j

(3) Plaintiff Eric Mortensen's Motion to Strike. Oral argument was heard on March 5, 2012. Eric
Mortensen appeared pro !:ie. Amber Dina appeared on behalf of Defendants. At the conclusion of
oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement.

4

5
6
7
8

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDtJRAL HISTORY

On February 7, 2007, Plaintiff Eric Mortensen ("Mortensen" or "Plaintifr') borrowed
$148,000 from Defendant Ace Mortgage Funding, LLC (<<Ace Mortgage") as evidenced by an
Adjustable Rate Note ("Note") and secured by a Deed of Trust ('~DOT") on real property located

9

at 549 Longford in Meridian, Idaho ("Property"). (Compl. ~I 3.1; Aff. of Amber N. Dina in Supp.
10:

of Req. for Judicial Notice (<<Dina Aff.") Exs. A [Note], B [DOT].) The DOT lists MERS as
11
12

"nominee for the Lender and Lender's successors and assigns" and Defendant Stewart Title

13

Company ("Stewart Title") as the Trustee. (Dina AIT. Ex. B. p 2.) On January 24, 2011. MERS

14

assigned the Ueed of Trust to BONY. (Compl. Attach. 14.) BONY then appointed ReconTrust

15

successor trustee. (1d. Attach. 15.)

16
17

18

Plain.tiff experienced 4<a dramatic decrease in income in 200S" and tried to sell the
Property, but could not. (lel " 3.2-33.) Plaitltiff then attempted to sell the Property via sh<:>rt

sale, but "all offers were rejected ... by Countrywide." (ld.

ru 3.4-3.6.) Plaintiff sought a loan

19

modification and was offered a trial payment plan; Plaintiff does not allege that he made all of
20

the payments 'under the trial plan or that he qualified for a permanent modification. (Jd.
21
22

23

24

3.10. Attach. 6.) Plaintiff failed to make the required monthly payments under the Note and
DOT, and ReconTrust recorded a Notice of Default on January 25, 2011. (/d Attach. 72.) On

May 19, 2011, ReconTrust issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale setting the foreclosure sale for

25
26

"1 3.8-
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1

September 26, 2011. (Id. Attach. 23.) The Property was sold in October 2011 to BONY. (Dina

AfC Ex. C [Trustee's Deed].)
:3

Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages

4

on October 26, 2011. In his complaint. Mortensen alleges causes of action for (1) Breach of

.')

Fiduciary Duty against Ace Mortgage Funding, Stewart Title Company, and Bank of America

6

Home Loans; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty against ReconTrust and Bank of America; (3)

7

Violation(s) of Truth in Lending Act~ (4) Vi.olation(s) of Deed of Trust Act; (5) Violation(s) of

B

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (6) Violation(s) of Consumer Protection Act; (7)
9

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9)
10
11

12

Misrepresentation by Trustce; and (10) Violation(s) of Title 26, Subtitle-A, Chapter-I,
Subchapter M. Part-II §§ 850-862 and Securities Fraud.

13

14

MOTtON TO STlUKl'

15

Admissibility of evidence is a matter within the Court's discretion. Burgess v. /\almon

16

River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,574.903 P.2d 730,739 (1995). To determine wheUler a

17

trial court has abused its discretion, the appellate courts will consider whether the trial conrt

18

"correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its
19

discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and ,,·,rhether it reached its decision by
20

an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idalio 53, 57.44 P.3d 1108,
22

n 12 (2002).

Plaintiff requests the Court strike the Affidavit of Amher N. Dina. Plaintiff asserts that

23

Ms. Dina cannot testify in place of Defendants or on Defendants' behalf, and that the Idaho State

24

Bar Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics and the America Bar Association condemn such

25
2:6
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testimony in a11i.davit form when the actual Defendants are capable of submitting an afl:1davit
themselves. The Court rejects these assertions. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is DENIED.

4

5
6
7

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request, pursuant to LR.C.P. 44(d), that the Court take judicial notice of the
Note, Deed of Trust, and Trustee's Deed. These documents were provided to the

COliI1

in the

Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Request for Judicial Notice on December 22, 2011.
Plaintiff signed the Note on February 7, 2007. Plaintiff relies on the Note in his Verified

9

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages. Plaintiff executed the Deed of
10
11

12

Trust, and it was recorded on February 13,2007. The Trustee's Deed was recorded on November

1,201 L

13

The Deed of Trust and Trustee's Deed arc copies of the records of the Ada County

14

Recorder's Office. These are the type of documents that are not suhject to reasonable dispute and

15

are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be

16

readily questioned. Additiona.ily, Plaintiff relies 011 the Note for multiple claims in his complaint.

The Court will take judicial notice of the Note. Deed of Trust, and Trustee's Deed
18

pursuant to LR.E. 201. Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice is GRAl\.T'fED.
19

20
MOTION TO DISMISS
21
22

A. Legal Standard

23

1\n Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is appropriate when there

24

arc no genuine issues of material fact and the case may be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v.

25

Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). The non-moving party

26
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is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked

ld. "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will

2

whether a claim for relief has been stated.

3

ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to offer evidence 1.0 support the claims. '" Id.
(quoting Orthmall v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962. 895 P .2d 561, 563 (l995)). If the

5

plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon which the court could grant relief: the complaint should

6

be dismissed. Johnson v. Boundary Sch. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 P .3d 457, 460

7

(2003).

8

It is clear that the court may not consider evidence or facts outside the scope of the
9

pleadings when determining if the petition states a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
10
11
12

court, however, may consider facts that supplement those stated in the complaint, of which the

{:ourt may properly take judicial notice. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273. 276, 796 P.2d 150,

13

153 (Ct. ApI'. 1990). Where matters outside the pleadings are submitted in support of a party's

14

motion to dismiss, a court must treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment

15

Id. at 273,150; Masi v. Seale. 106 Idaho 561, 562. 682 P.2d 102, 103 (1984).
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiffs first and second causes of action allege breach of fiduciary duty against

18

Defendants Ace Mortgage Funding, Stewart Title Company, Bank of Amerka Home Loans,

19

ReconTrust, and Bank of America. While Plaintiff names both Bank of America Home Loans
2G

and Bank of America, the Court's understanding of the parties is that that the appropriate party is
21

22
23

Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"). Only Defendants MERS, BANA. BONY. and ReconTrust

havc filed a Motion to Dismiss; Ace Mortgage has not af:tpeart.'d in this suit yet, and Stewart Title

24

t1led a Notice of Appearance on March 16, 2012. Therefore, tile Court will consider the breach

2S

of fiduciary duty claims only as against Defendants BANA and Recoll Trust.

26
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"To establish a claim for breach of Hduciary duty, the plaintiff must first establish that a
2

fiduciary relationship existed at fue time of the breach." Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151

3

Idaho 701, 705, 263 P.3d 755, 759 (2011). "A fiduciary relationship exists when one party is

4

under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefIt of the other upon a matter within the scope of

5

the relation." ld. "Such a relationship does not exist when parties are dealing with one another at

6

'ann's length.'" High Valley Concrete, L.L.c. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 428, 234 P.3d 747, 752

7

(2010). "Whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of law." Beaudoin v. Davidson

8

Trusl Co., 151 Idaho at 705, 263 P.3d at 759.
90

Plaintiff alleges that BANA owes him a fiduciary duty because SANA "solicited and
10

intentionally induced the trust, confidence and reliance of the Plaintiffs'" and "had superiQr
11
12

knowledge regarding the consequences of the failure to procure the original loan, as wen as the

13

loan modification and delay of the sale" and that PlaintiffS relied on BANA's advice, just as

14

BANA "knew or should have known Plaintiff would." (Compl. 14.3.) Plaintiff contends BANA

15

"refused to cooperate with Plaintiffs efforts at a resolution to this matter," (ld. '4.4.) Plaintiff

16

alleges a trustee (presumably RcconTrust) "has a fiduciary duty toward tb.e Plaintiffs to insure

17

that the [DOT] does not get split fh>m the Note and pooled and securitized outside the State of

18

Idaho." (ld.

1 5.1.) Plaintiff alleges ReconTrust breached that fiduciary duty "by continuing the

19

sale when Plaintiff was seeking loan modification." (ld

1 5.2.) PlaintifTaUeges both BANA and

20

ReconTrust breached their fiduciary duties "by failing to provide meaningful contact infonnation
21

22
23

24

regarding who actually had the promissory note and

rDOTl to prevent fue trustee's sale" and by

"failing to enjoin the August 7, 2010~ trustee's sale despite receiving numerous telephone calls,
e~mail and faxes ... and being served on the day of the sale with the original Complaint, Summons

and Lis Pendent." (ld. " 5.3-5.4.)
26
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ReconTrust, the successor trustee, sent the Notice of Default to PlaintifI Idaho Code §

1
2

45-1504(2) states, "[ u]pon recording the appointment of a successor trustee in each county in

3

which the deed of trust is recorded, the successor trustee shall be vested with all powers of an

4

original trustee," The Court interprets this to mean that all powers and all responsibilities rest
with the successor trustee, ReconTrust. However, it is clear that to the extent any trustee owed

6

the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, that duty only extended to the borrower's attempts to tender the

7

amount due to cure the default. Diamond v, Sandpoint Title Ins" Inc" 132 Idaho 145, 151, 968
8

P.2d 240, 250 (1998). Idaho Code § 45-1502 does not articulate a fiduciary duty owed by a
trustee to a borrower. It is not clear to this court that the trustee has the power or duty over any
Hl
11

12

aspect other than the trustee's sale triggered by certain contingencies, such as a default by the
borrower. Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d 104&. 1049 (1983), Indeed. other

13

courts have held that "a trustee in a nonjudicial foreclosure is 'nol a true trustee with fiduciary

14

duties. but rather a common agent for the trustor and beneficiary. m Gaitan v. Mortgage

15

Electronic Registration Systems. 2009 WL 3244729 at *12 (CD. Cal. 2009) (quoting

16

Hendrickson v. Popular Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 2009 WL 1455491, at *7 (N.D. Cal May 21,

11

is

2009».
Plaintiff has not asserted that he atte.fll~'}ted to cure the default by offering a tender of
payment, nor that he is capable of doing so. The Court is not aware of, nor has it been provided

20

.

.

with, any case law that provides the trustee with a fiduciary duty'to postpone or enjoin the
21

22
23

trustee's sale without an attempt by the borrower to cure the default by tendering payment, to
prevent the split ofthe deed of trust and note, or to pro vide the plaintiff v"ith the location of the
promissory note and DOT. Because Plaintiff did not allege that he attempted to cure the default

25
2(;
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by paying the amount due, it cannot be said that the trustee violated a fiduciary duty to the
2
3

plaintiff.
Likewise, the Court is not awarc of, and has not becn presented with, allY case law
assigning a fiduciary duty between a bank and a borrower. Generally, the relationship between a

s

bank lender and a borrower is a debtor~creditor relationship, not a fiduciary relationship, Idaho
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277. 824 P.2d 841, 852 (1991). The

.,
Idaho Supreme Court previously considered cases from other jurisdictions which held that there
8

are some instances in which a fiduciary relationship may arise between a lender and borrower,
9

but the Court ultimately rejected the claim of a fiduciary rdatioll!)hip. Id.; see also Black Canyon
10

Racquetball Club v. First National Batik, 119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991).
11

12

Additionally, the Court is not aware of, nor has it been presented witll, any case law that
prescribes a fiduciary duty on the servicing agent. In Castaneda, the court, when referring to the

14

lender, the beneficiary, and the loan servicer, stated, "'[aJbsent special circumstances a loan

15

transaction is at arms-length and no duties arise li'om the loan transaction outside of those in the

16

agreement." Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg. Services, Inc., 687 P.8upp.2d 1191, 1198, (E.D. Cal.

11

18

2009) (quoting Rangel v. DB! Mortgage Co., Ltd., 2009 WL 2190210, at *3 (E.D.CaL July 21,
2009)). Plaintiff has not alleged that any such special crrcumstrulc:es exist. BANA's role as the

19

loan serviceI' does 110t irnpoStl any fiduciary duty upon it
20

Plaintiff also asserts that BANA created a fiduciary duty by intentionally 'inducing the
21

22

trust, confidence and reliance of Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this duty was breached wIlen

23

BANA retused to cooperate with Plaintiff to resolve the matter. The Court has taken judidal

24

notice of the Note. The Note specifically states how much was due. when it

25

Plaintiff was to send payment The Note addresses default. stating that upon a Notice of Default

26
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WIl.."l

due, and where

the past due amount becomes due and, possibly, the entire principal remaining due. Plaintiff has
never alleged that he offered or was able to pay the past due amount or the principal upon the
3

default The Court has also taken judicial notice of the DOT. The Court does not see, nor has it

4

been made aware of, any provisions in the loan docUlllents that create a tiduciary duty to the

S

borro""'Cf or require that the lender must modify the loan upon default. There is no evidence that
the servicing agent did not engage in the modification process with PlaintitI. In filet, Plaintiff

"7

sought a loan modification and was offered a trial payment plan, but Plaintiff chose to not make
the payments. (CompI.~' 3.8-3.10. Attach. 6.)
9

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which give rise to a fiduciary duty owed tu him by
10
11

12

Defendants or that any such duty has been breached. Plaintiff alleges nothing more than an annslength loan transaction and an ordinary lender-horrower relationship between himself and

11

Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

14

C. Violation of Truth in Lending Aet

15

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") because

"Plaintiffs [sic] did not receive documents and disclosures: from Countrywide Horne loan,
17

18

[BAN A] , [MERS], and [ReconTrust), as required under the Truth in Lending Act, the RESPA
Standards," and therethre, Plaintiff is "entitled to damages: and/or rescission rights." (CompI.

1

19

6.2.) In Plaintiffs response brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintitf also
20

contends that he \vas "rushed through toe lending process, not given a signed copy by

l~fl(ler of

21

22

the Loan Note or Deed of Trust. not notified that his Loan and/or Deed. of Trus! was being placed

23

in a POOling and Servicing Agreement, not clearly informe<i of the contents ofthe loan note, and

24

when Plaintiff offered to make a payoff of the note by requesting it under a [QWR] the

25

26
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1

Defendants refused, in writing, to provide the documents that would have allowed Plaintiff to
settle his debt." (Pl.'s Opp. Br. 22.)

3

The statute of limitations for a TILA damage claim is «within one year from the date of

4

the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e); Shaw v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 2009

5

WL 790166, at *4 (D. Idaho 2009) (stating "[t]he 'occurrence of the violation' is pre.'>umably the
date tbe loan was finalized" and dismissing plaintiff's time-barred TILA damages claim); see

7

also Monaco v. Bear Stearns Re;~id. Mortg. Corp., 554 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1039 (C.D. CaL 2008)

8

(dismissing the time-barred TILA claim for damages). The limitations statute is triggered when a
borrower enters into a loan agreement with a creditor. See e.g., KIng v. Cal., 784 F.2d 910, 9[5
10
th

(9 Cir. 1986).
11

12

A TlLA rescission claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.CA. §
1635(t) ("an obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation

14

of the transaction ...."). 'The statute of limitations for rescission is also triggered when the

15

borrower enters into the loan agreement with the creditor. See, e.g., King, 784 F.2d at 915.

16

Plaintiff obtained his loan in February 2007. (CompI.

1 3.1.) The instant action

'was not

filed until October 26, 2011, over three years too late to assert a claim for TILA damages.
H1

Plaintiff's rescission claim is also barred by the applicable limitations period, which expired in

19

J'cbruary 2010. Plaintiff contends the statute of limitations does not apply to his case because
20

Defendants' "TlLA violations are defensive in nature to enjoin foreclosure." (ld. 16.3.)
21

22

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that it is generally disfavored to file a motio11 to

23

dismiss OIl the groUll¢; of the statute of limitations. Singleton v. FOSler, 98 Idaho 149, 151, 559

24

P.2d 765, 767 (1977). But, the concurrence in Singleton stated, "1 do not wish to be construed as

25

adhering to the view that a statute of limitations can never be raised by a motion to dismiss under

26
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1

LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)." Id There are multiple cases in which the Idaho Supreme Court has found it

2

appropriate to raise the affim1ative defense of the statute of limitations in a motion to dismiss.

3

The Court finds there is no ambiguity or dispute regarding when the applicable statute of

4

limitations began to run, nor whether or not they have been tolled to prevent dismissal of the

5

applicable claims. Plaintiff is the initiator of this cause of action. Therefore. his case is not
~'defensive" and Defendants may raise statute of limitations issues.

I'ebruary of 2007. Plaintiff has asserted no alternative date

a.<;

Plaintiff obtained his loan in

the occurrence of the violation;

8

therefore, the Court finds the statute of limitations began to run at the time the loan was finalized
9

in 2007, and Plaintiff's TILA claim is time·barreu.
10

Even if Plaintiffs TILA claim is not time-barred, Plaintiff's TILA claim fails because
11

12

Plaintiff does not and cannot allege tender. Rescission is a party's unilateral unmaking of a

13

<:ontn:l.ct and is generally a defense for a l10ndefaulting party. Black's Law Dictionary 1332 (8 th

14

ed. 2004). "A claim for rescission requires plaintiffs to allege they can or will tender the

15

borrowed funds back to the lender;' Kamp v. Aurora Loan Services. 2009 WL 3177636

16

(C.D.Cal. 2009); see }'amamoLo v. Bank

17

("rescission should be conditioned on repayment of the amounts advanced by the lender"); see

18

Garza v. Am. Home Mortg.• 2009 WL 188604. at * 5 (E.D. Cal. 20(9) (dismissing TILA claim in

ol

N. }~, 329 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003)

19

light of LaHurc tu allege tender because "[r]escission is an empty remedy without [plaintiff]'s
20

ability to pay back what she has received"). Plaintiff has been consistently in default; it does not
21

appear he would be able to meet the tender requirement of TILA. nor has he argued such ahility,
23

24

thus preventing rescission.
Plaintiff's TILA claim also fails because Plaintiff has failed to allege how Defendants

25

violated TILA. Tarasanla v. Homecomings Financial. LLC, 2009 WL 3055227, at

26
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* 3 (S.D. Cal.

1
2
3

2009) (TILA claim dismissed because "lpJlaintiffs do not allege which provisions of the TILA
were violation by which [dJefcndant nor do [pJlaintiffs aUege <non~conclusory factual content'
which is 'plausibly suggestive of a [TILA] claim entitling the plaintiffs to relief:"'). Mortensen

only sets forth a vague, conclusory statement that he is entitled to damages and rescission under
5

TILA because he '~did not receive documents and disclosures." But. Plaintiff does not plead any
facts describing what "documents and disclosures" he believes he should have received.

7

Finally, Plaintiff's TILA claim fails because he has failed to plead detrimental relianee on

any allegedly inadequate disclosure - also a necessary element of any claim for actual damages
based upon an aUeged TILA violation. IS U.S.C,A. § 1640(a); Gold Country Lenders v. Smith,
10

289 F. 3d 1155. 1157 (9th Cit. lOGS).
11

12

The Court finds that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon whieh the Court oould grant
relief. Plainti.ff's Truth in Lending Act claim is dismissed.

D. Violation of Deeds of Trust Act
15

Plaintiff asserts that ReconTrust lacked standing to toreclose on his property. (CompI. ,

16

7.3.) TIle Idaho Supreme Court recently considered lItis issue. in Trmter v. Bank of New York

17

Mellon et al. and ultimately rejected the contention that a party must have "standingn to initiate

18

non-judicial foreclosure:

19
20
21

23

24

Trotter asks the Court to find a standing requireUlcllt in lhe Act, without providing
a textual basis or citing to controHing precedent. However, nothing in the text of
the statute can reasonably be read to require the trustee to prove it has "standing"
before foreclosing. Instead, the plain language of the ~1atute makes it clear that the
trustee may foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies with the requirements
contained within the Act.

111e Act states that "a deed of trust executed in conformity with this act may be
foreclosed by advertisement and sale" in accord with the procedures it describes.
I.C. § 45-1503(1). Those procedures are set forth in I.e. § 45-1505 ....

25

<: 6
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2

3
4

Additionally, once the notice of default bas been recorded, the tmstt;c must give
formal notice of the trustee's sale to parties specified in the statute. See I.e. § 451506. These are the only requirements that precede foreclosure. We hold that,
pursuant to I.e. § 45-1505, a trustee fIlay initiate nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership of the underlying,
note or demonstrating that the deed of trust beneticiary has requested or
authorized the trustee to initiatt: thuse pwct--"edings.

5

The record confirms that the Appointment of Successor Trustee, Notice of
6

8
9
10
11

Default, and Notice of Trustee's Sale COJillplied with the statutory requirements
and were recorded as specified in the statute, and the district court found that the
defendants met tbe requirements of I.C. §§ 45-1505 and 45-1506. Because there
is no statutory requirement for the trustee to prove standing betore initiating a
nonjudicial foreclosure on a deed of trust, we affirm the district court's order
dismissing Trotter's claims.

--- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 206004, at *3-4 (2012).
Like in Trotter, the record here confirms thal the Appointment of Successor Trustee,
Notice of Default, and Notice of Trustee's Sale complied with the statutory requirements and

13

were recorded as specified in the statute. The Deed of Trust. which Plaintiff signed on February

14

7, 2007, specifically authQrized Stewart Title Co. as the trustee and MERS as the nominee for the
15

lender. (Dina Aft: Ex. B, p. 2.) Idaho Code § 45-1505 specifically grants the trustee the ability to
16
17

18

foreclose upon a default. Idaho Code § 45-1504 specifically gives tbe trustee the ability to resign
and be replaced and that any successor trustee shall have the powers of the original trustee.

19

Plaintiff was provided notice that Stewart Title Co. had been replaced by a successor trustee in

20

January 201 1 as evidenced by the Appointment of Successor Trustee. (Compl. Attach. 15.)

21

ReoonTrust recorded a Notice of Default on January 25, 2011. (fd, Attach. 22.) On May 19,

22

20 I 1, ReconTrust issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale setting the foreclosure sale. (ld. Attach. 23.)

23

Defendants met the requirements ofI.C. §§ 45~1505 and 45-1506. Plaintiff's assertions regarding

24

RcwnTruSl's standing to initiate foreclosure fail.
25
2G
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Plaintiff also alleges MERS '''cannot demonstrate that it is the beneficiary as defined by
2

statute, and as such, lacks the standing to assign any of its alleged interests to the subject

J

property due to the unlawful splitting of Plaintiff's wet ink note and deed of trust, and removal

<1

from the State of Idaho." (ld. ~ 7.2.) Plaintiff specifically agreed to MERS' role as the nominee

S

for the lender in the DOT. (Dina Aff. Ex. B.) Further, Plaintiff has not provided any cont~olling

6

precedent to support his asscrtion that MERS. as the lender's nominee cannot assign its interest

7

in the DOT. Plaintiff discusses In re Veal at length in his opposition. But, In re Veal is a

8

bankruptcy court case from Arizona and, as such. does not trump the binding Trotter decision.
9

Trotter. 2012 WL 206004, at *3 n.3 (decisions relating to standing in bankruptcy proceedings are
10

'~inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial foreclosure."').

Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided support for his assertion that both the Note and
13

DOT must not be securitized. In Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans. Inc., the 9 th Circuit

14

Court of Appeals specifically upheld a foreclosure in which MERS was the nominee for the

15

lender, regardless of whether the note was split from the deed. 656 F 3d 1034, 1044 (Q tlt Cir.
2011). The court slateu, "[elven if we were to accept the plaintiffi' premises that MERS is a

1.7

Hi

sham beneficiary and the note is split from the deed, we would reject the plaintiffs' conclusion

that. as a nccessary consequence. no party has the power to foreclose." !d. "Further, even if we
were to accept the plaintiffs' contention that MERS is a sham beneficiary and the note is split

20

from the deed in the MERS system, it does not tollo\\1 that any attempt to foreclose after the
22

23

plaintiffs defaulted on their lOaIIS is necessarily 'WTongful.·~' Jd at 1047.
Plaintiff also claims that MERS is no longer registered in the State of Idaho and

'1 7..2.) According to

24

therefore, "is prohibited from engaging in any business practices." (Compi.

25

I.e. § 30-1-1501(2)(g), "[c]reating or acquiring indehtedness, mortgages and security interests in

26
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1
2

3
'1

5

real or personal property" does not constitute transacting business within the state, requiring a
certificate of authority from the Secretary of State.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Deed of Trust Act.
E. Violation(s) oJ Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
12 U.S.C. § 2605 requires that borrowers be notified if there is a change in the servicerof

their loan. Section 2605 also requires the loan service!' to respond to borrower inquiries; §
7

8

2605(e)(1) states:

(A) III general

9
10

1.2

If any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written
request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower) jur information relating
to the servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written res.ponse
acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal
public holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken
within such period.

13

(B) Qualified written request

15

For purposes of this subsection, a qualified written request shall b~ a written
correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon or other payment medium
supplied by the servicer, that--

16
l!

18
19

(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and account of
the borrower; and
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower. to the extent
applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer
regarding other information sought by the borrower.

20

'Section 2605(1)( 1) states:
21

22
23

Whoever fails to comply with. any provision of this section shall be liable to the
borrower for each such failure in the following amounts:
(1) Individuals

24.

In the case of any action by an individual. an amount equal to the sum of-~
25
26
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(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and

(B) any additional damages, as the court may anow. in the case of a pattern or
practi.ce of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not
to exceed $1,000.

2

3

Plaintiff asserts he repeatedly contacted Defendants to obtain a loan modification, to
5

validate Defendants' standing to foreclose, and to identify the physical location of the "wet ink}'
Note and DOT, which constituted qualified written requests (QWRs) under RESPA. (See e.g.,

7

CompI. "

3.13, 3.14, 3.16, 3.24, 3.27, 8.2.) Plaintiff also alleges that BANA's failures

8

enumerated in paragraphs 3.40 - 3.45 of the complaint constitute a violation ofRESPA. (ld. at"
8.4.)
10

Section 2605 specificaUy applies to requests for infonnation relating to loan servicing.
12

Plaintiff does not assert he sent Defendants qualified written requests regarding the servicing of
his loan or that hi~ account was in error. A qualified written request must contain an inquiry or

14

request for the loan servicer relating to loan servicing. Just because Plaintiff sent a letter to the

15

loan servicer does not mean the substance of his requests had anything to do with loan servicing.

16

Indt;:ed, ca::;e law would indicate that correspondence requesting a loan modification does not

17

18

itself qualify as a qualified written request under RESPA. In re Thorian. 387 B.R. 50, 70 (D.
Idaho 2008).

19

Plaintiff also fails to assert any "actual damages." He only requests the additional
20

damages authorized under § 2605(£). which are intended as' punitive damages for repeated
21

22

violations of RESPA. in addition to actual danlages. In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants'

23

failures 'warrant iIijunctive relief against the foreclosure sale" and "any additional remedies this

24

court finds equitable." (Id.

25

other equitable remedies." Serrano v. World Sav. Bank FSB. 2011 WL 1668631 at *1 (N.D. Cal.

26
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1 8.4-8.5.)

But, "RESPA does not provide for injunctive relief or

1
2

3

2011) (holding that the plaintiff's claim that she is entitled to enjoin foreclosure and obtain other

relief based on RESPA violations fails).
Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim for relief under RESPA upon ~11ich relief may be

granted.
F. Violadon(s) of Consumer Protection Act
6
7

Plaintiff's complaint claims a violation of the Idaho Consumer Prolection Act. 'Ine ICP A
only allows recovery for 4<certain specific prohibited actions that are deemed to be unfair or

8

deceptive." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846. 243 P.3d 642 t 662 (2010); see also I.e. §

48-603(1)-(19). The statute oflimitations under this Act is two years. I.e. § 48-619.
10

Plaintiff's complaint fails to state which specific prohibited unfair or deceptive practice
11

12

Defendants engaged in. The complaint is also unclear as to when the alleged violations occurred,

13

which acts were unfair and deceptive, and which of the f'Ow' defendants he believes misled or

14

deceived him. In. Taylor v. McNichols, the Idaho Supreme Court found that because the plaintiff

15

failed to allege which specific prohibited unfair or deceptive practices the defendants had
engaged in, he had failed to state a claim for which reBef could be granted. 149 [d<lhu at 846, 243

P.3d at 662.
IS

Furthermore. the Idaho Supreme Court has held that debts arising from the sale of goods

19

and services are subject to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. but other debts are not covered.
:10

In re Western Acceptance Carp.; Inc., 117 Idaho 399,401, 788 p.2i24I. 243 (l990)(statiJlg that
21

22
23

24

"[d1ebts that do not arise out of the sale of goods and services subject to the provisions of the Act
are not covered.") The loan transaction in question is not a debt that "arose out of the sale of

goods or services" and is therefore not covered under the Act.

25
26
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1
2

3

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act upon which relief
may be granted.
G. Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress

4

Plaintiff must show four elements to be able to recover for intentional infliction of

5

emotional distress: (1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be

6

extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal colmectioll between the wrongful conduct

7

and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. J:.,'vans v. Twin Falls

8

CounJy,

118 Idaho 210.220, 796 P.2d 87.97 (1990).

9

"Merely exercising a legal right does not satisfY the outrageousness element of an
10
11
12

emotional-.distress claim. To be aetionable, the conduct must be so extreme as to "aroUse an

average member of the community to resentment against the defendant," and "must be more than

13

unreasonable, unkind, or unfair." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 4.37,446-47,

14

235 P.3d 387, 396-97 (2010) (quoting 86 C,J.S. Torts § 74 (2009». "The law intervenes only

15

where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."

1h

Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 741, 132 1>.Jd 1261, 1269 (Ct. App. 2006).
Plaintiff alleges that BANA and ReconTrust's "callous attitude and clear unwillingness to

18

work with [him] caused [him) significant emotional distress," (Compi. , 10.2.) Plaintiff also

19

alleges that he was emotionally distressed by BANA and RecouTrust's "poor treatment of [him]
20

during this difficult time" and that his distress' was manifested ~'by depression, sadness,
:frustration, anger, affecting everyone in the family including 4 children,)' (ld. " 10.2-10.3.)
23

Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim faillS bt':C3use Plaintiff has

24

failed to allege what conduct Defendants engaged in that was extreme and outrageous. Plaintiff

25

has only made conclusory allegations that Defendants treated him poorly, had a "callous

26
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1

attitude," and were unwilling to work with Plaintiff. Defendants merely exercised thei~ right
under the DOT, which Plaintiff granted, to initiate foreclosure proceedings after Plaintiff failed

3

to make his monthly payments. (Dina Aff. Ex. B.)

4

Additionally. while economic distress resulting in default and foreclosure would cause a

5

borrower sadness or frustration or anger, the emotional distress alleged must be severe. The loan

documents made clear that default would result from a failure to make the loan payments.
7

Plaintiff failed to make the loan payments, and default resulted.

B

lliaintiff has failed to allege any fnets to support his cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
10

may be granted.
11
12

13

H. Negligent Infliction of EmotioBal Distress
Plaintiff must show four elements to be able to recover fur negligent infliction of
emotional distress: (1) a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain

15

standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal cormection between the conduct and

16

the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. In addition to these four elements, there must

17

be some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's emotional injury. Johnson v. McPhee, 147

IS

Idaho 455, 466~ 210 P.3d 563~ 574 (Ct. App. 2{)09). "The 'physical injury' requirement is

19

designed to provide some guarantee of the genuineness of the claim in the face of the danger that
20

claims of mental hurm ",ill be falsified or

imagined.'~

Czaplicki 'v, Gooding Joint School Disl.

21
22

23

No. 231. 116 Idaho 326, 332, 775 P.2d 640,646 (1989).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants' conduct was negligent "insofar as the defendants failed to

24

take reasonable care to avoid causing Plaintiffs, a famity with children, emoti'Onal distress and

25

anxiety." (CompI.

26
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1 11.2.) '~While Idaho recognizes the tort of negligent infliction 'Of emotional

1
2

distress ... there must be a breach of a recognized legal duty in order to support a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress." Nation v. Slate, Dept. a/Correction, 144 Idaho 177.

:3

191, 158 P.3d 953, 967 (2007). Additionally, <4[i]n order for a cause of action to arise in tort,

4

Claimants must establish the breach of a tort duty, separate and apart from any duty allegedly

5

created by the contract." Baccus v. Ameripride Serv., inc., 145 IdallO 346, 350, 179 P.3d 309,
313 (2008). Other than asserting Defendants treated him poorly, Plaintiff has not pled any of the

7

elements of a negligence claim, nor claimed Defendants had any duty to him outside of the
contract. And, as the Court has already discussed, a lender-borrower relationship does not

<)

impose any duty of care upon Defendants. See (B) above. As no duty is owed, uone luts been
10

breached.
11
12

Additionally, while Plaintiff has alleged his emotional distress and anxiety is evidenced

13

by "depression, sadness, frustration, anger, and time away from employment arld being \\1th. the

14

family," it is unclear that Plaintiff has suffered an iJ1jury beyond the economic 10s8 of bis home.

15

(Comp!. " 11.2- 11.3.) Plaintiff's assertion that he is «entitled to compensation because of the

16

poor treatment that [he] received" does not identifY damages he supposedly incurred. (Id. 'If 11.4.)

17

"Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic

is

losses in a negligence action, because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another."

19

Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, JOO, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005). An exception
20

applies ifthere is a "special relationship," but Plaintiff~ not asserted such a relationship exists.

21
22

2.1

24

Id. at 301. Absent non-economic damages, no relief could be granted to PlaintitT under this claim
regardless of its validity.
Plaintiff's negligent intliction of emotional distress claim fails because he has not

25

adequately pled its elements.

26
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1. Misrepresentation by Trustee
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states that claims of fraud must be pled with
3
4

5

particularity. The nine clements of fraud are:
(1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance;
(6) the hearer's ignorance of the fulsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the
hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.

Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, inc., 147 Idaho 378, 3&6, 210 P.3d 63, 71 (2009) (quoting
8

Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 ldall0 829., 833. 172 P.3d 11 04, 1108 (2007)). The absence of anyone
9

of the elements is fatal to recovery, Id. The party alleging fraud must specify the factual
10

circumstances that constitute the fraud in their pleadings. Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 ldal10 at
11

12

13

833. 172 P.3d at 1108.
Plaintiff aUeges Defendants "held the authority to postpone the foreclosure sale and to
allow Plaintiff to receive a modification" and that their alleged failure to "inform the Plaintiff of

is

this fact" "deprived [him1 the chance to be qualified for HAMP'~ and constituted a

16

misrepresentation. (CotnpL ,

12.2,) A failure to inform cannot constitute an actiol121ble

misrepresentation. Plaintiff also alleges the infonnation Defendants provided "was material
1B

because reliance on such facts would result in the wrongful foreclosure sale ofPlainfiffs~ house."

19

(ld. '112.3.) Plaintiff fails to show how his lack of knowledge that Defendants could postpone the
20

sale was material or how that lack of knowledge caused the foreclosure. Plaintiff also fails to
21

22
23

24

state how any alleged representations Defendants made were false.
Plaintiff contends he "relied on the information and [he was] justified in [his] reliance

because of the fiduciary relationship between" Plaintiff and Defendant. (lei

25
26
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1 12.4.) Plaintiff's

1

conclusory contention that he relied upon the lack of infonnation and that he was justified in his
reliance is based on Plaintiirs failed claim that Defendants owe him a fiduciary duty.
Finally, Plaintiff stutes he is "entitled to be compensated for the damages they suffered <u>

a result of' Defendants~ conduct. (Id. , 12.5.) But, Plaintiff fails to state what injury and
damages he incurred. Plaintiff has asserted that he could not make his loan payments and he was
6
7

offered a triallonn modification, but failed to follow through with it.
Plaintiff alleges no facts to suppoti the elements of a fraud claim. Because Plaintiff has

8

failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity pursuant to LR.C.P. 9(b), Plaintiffs fails to
9

state a claim for misrepresentation upon whieh relief may be granted.
10
11

J. Violation(s) of Title 26, Subtitie.-A, Chapter-I, Subchapter M, Part-U §§ 850-862 and
Securities Fraud.
Plaintiff claims Defendants engaged in securities fraud because (I) "the loan was sold,

13

pooled and tumed into a security"; (2) "once the Note was converted into a stock, or stock
equivalent, it is no longer a note"; and (3) securitization deprives the Note of its security "and file

15

right to foreclose through the [D011 is forever gone." (Compl. "

133-13.5.) This claim fails

16

because Plaintiff's loan does not fall within the protections of federal securities law. See Reves v.
18

Ernst & YQung, 494 U.S. 56, 65. 110 S.Ct. 945, 951 (1990) (adopting Second Circuit Cuurt of

19

Appeal's "family resemblance" approach whieh begins with a presumption that any note with a

20

term of more than nine months .is a <tsecurity/' but in recognizing that n{)t all notes are seGurities,

21

creates a list of notes that are obviously

22

mortgage on a home),

23

110t

securities, which includes nOles !:>ecured by a

Plaintiff' s se~urities fraud claim is essential! y prernised on allegations that the

24

securitization process split the note and DOT and stripped the Nole urit:::; securiLY and ownership
25
26
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1

by any of the defendants. But, securitization does not invalidate the DOT or have a negative

2

impact on ownership of the Note; the Note states it may be transferred without notice to the

3

borrower. (Dina Afi: Exs. A, B.)

4

Plaintiffs securities fraud claim fails.

6

CONCLUSION
7

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is DENIED, Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice is
8

GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
9

10

Dated this
11

---

12
13
14

15
16

17

19
20

21
22

23

24
2:'>

:2 6
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1

I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of March, 2012 I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
J

STRIKE, GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the foHowing;
5

Eric Mortensen
4282 N. Forest Meadow Ave.

Boise, ID 83704
6

<iI U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

"/

9

Kelly Greene McConnell
Amber N. Dina
Givens Pursley LLP

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, 10 83701-2720
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16
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIA-:;L-'D~~~n
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

DALE GORDON, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
)
ASSOCIATION, "Fannie Mae;" IBM
)
LENDER BUSINESS PROCESS
)
SERVICES, INC., believed to be a foreign )
corporation registered in Idaho; FIRST
)
HORIZON HOME LOANS, a Division of )
First Tennessee Bank, N.A.; PIONEER
)
TITLE COMPANY OF ADA COUNTY, an)
Idaho Corporation; ALLIANCE TITLE
)
AND ESCROW CORP., an Idaho
)
Corporation; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE, )
an Idaho Corporation; and MORTGAGE
)
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
)
SYSTEM, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

I.

CASE NO. CV-2011-1069
ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AND DISSOLVING
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDERIINJUNCTION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association, "Fannie Mae" (hereinafter
"FNMA"); Seterus, Inc. (fonnerly known as IBM Lender Business Process Services,
Inc.) (hereinafter "Seterus"); and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(hereinafter "MERS"), move to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Dale Gordon

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ANI) DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/INJUNCTION

(hereinafter "Gordon"Y wherein Gordon seeks quiet title to certain real estate in Bingham
County, Idaho. 2 Gordon objects to the Motion to Dismiss. 3 FNMA, Seterus, and MERS
also moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued in this matter. 4
A hearing was held on the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Dissolve
Injunction on January 4,2012. 5 Based upon the record, the arguments of the parties, and
the relevant authorities, the Motion to Dismiss, considered as a motion for summary
judgment, shall be granted.

II.

ISSUES

By its Motion to Dismiss, FNMA, Seterus, and MERS argue that the Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 Gordon maintains that the
relevant deed of trust is illegal and unenforceable and therefore Gordon should receive
quiet title to the real estate at issue.?
The questions raised by the Motion to Dismiss and Gordon's Objection include:
1.

Should the Motion to Dismiss be considered as a motion for summary

judgment?

J See: Motion to Dismiss, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no.
CV-2011-1069 (filed December 6,2011) (hereinafter the "Motion to Dismiss"); Complaint to Quiet Title,
Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed May
20,2011) (hereinafter the "Complaint").
2 See: Complflint, generally and at p.'2, , 2.
.
3 Memorandum in Objection to Dismissal & in Support of Motion for Declaratory Judgment and/or
Summary Judgment, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CV2011-1069 (filed December 28,2011) (hereinafter "Gordon's Objection").
4 Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham
County case no. CV-20IJ-!()69 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "Motion to Dissolve
Injunction"). See also: Temporary Restraining OrderlInjunction, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage
Association, Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed May 23,2011) (hereinafter the "Temporary
Restraining Order").
5 Minute Entry, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County case no. CY-20J J.
1069 (filed January 5, 2012).
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2.

Does Gordon raise a material fact issue with his allegation that the

defendants failed to maintain and produce the original promissory note?
3.

Does Gordon raise a material issue of fact as to quiet title?

4.

Does Gordon raise a material fact issue regarding unjust enrichment?

III.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Gordon and with all
inferences drawn in his favor. s
1.

On December 6, 2007, Gordon, by and through Bonnie Gordon who

signified herself as "attorney in fact," borrowed $342,900.00 from First Horizon Home
Loans, a Division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. (hereinafter "First Horizon").9 This loan
was memorialized in a promissory note (hereinafter the "Note"). 10
2.

Also on December 6, 2007, Gordon by and through Bonnie Gordon,

signed a Deed of Trust (hereinafter the "Trust Deed") whereby Gordon agreed to pay the
principal and interest due on the Note and conveyed in trust, with the power of sale, the
real estate in issue. II

6 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association,
Bingham County case no. CV-2011-1069 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "Memorandum
Supporting Motion to Dismiss").
7 Gordon'S Objection, atpp. 1-2.
8 Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008); Idaho Schools/or Equal Educational
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 578, 850 P.2d 724, 729 (1993).
9 Complaint, at Exhibit C.
,
.
10Id.
lJ Complaint, at Exhibit D. The real estate at issue is formally described as:
A PORTION OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF
SECTION 23, TOWNSHlP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN,
BINGHAM COUNTY, IDAHO, AS FOLLOWS:
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER
SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23, AND RUNNING THENCE
NORTH 599 FEET, THENCE WEST 2040 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 24°45' WEST 660
FEET, THENCE EAST 1005 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 40 RODS, THENCE EAST 40
RODS TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 40

3
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ANI) DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/INJUNCTION

3.

Gordon made some payments of principal and interest to the defendants. 12

FNMA notified Gordon of Gordon's failure to pay the August 1, 2009 installment of
principal and interest and all subsequent installments of principal and interest. 13 Gordon
was then notified of the trustee's intent to sell the Property. 14
4.

In his Complaint, Gordon alleges that should the defendants fail to show

that the Note has been kept by the lender and produced upon demand of the borrower,

RODS; THENCE EAST 20 RODS; THENCE NORTH 40 RODS; THENCE WEST 20
RODS TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING:
PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION
23, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BINGHAM
COUNTY, IDAHO, DESCRIBED AS;
BEGINNING AT A POINT THAT IS NORTH 890:37'56" WEST 513.63 FEET ALONG
THE SECTION LINE AND NORTH 00 0 15'08" EAST 37.00 FEET TO THE NORTH
RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF PARKS ROAD FROM THE SOUTH QUARTER
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 23 AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 89°37'56"
WEST 150.00 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE; THENCE NORTH
00°15'08" EAST 290.40 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89°37'56" EAST 150.00 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 000 15'08" WEST 290.40 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
ALSO INCLUDED IS THE FOLLOWING:
COMMENCING AT A POINT 23 RODS EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23,
AND RUNNING THENCE EAST 17 RODS; THENCE NORTH 40 RODS; THENCE
WEST 23 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 20 RODS, THENCE EAST 6 RODS; THENCE
SOUTH 20 RODS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING:
COMMENCING AT A POINT 23 RODS EAST OF THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 23,
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 34, EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BINGHAM
COUNTY, IDAHO. AND RUNNING THENCE EAST l7 RODS, THENCE NORTH
315 FEET; THENCE WEST 17 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 315 FEET TO THE POINT
OF BEGINNING. (Hereinafter the "Property.")
Complaint, at Exhibit A.
12 Complaint, at p. 2, ~ 4 (emphasis added).
13 Complaint, at Exhibit B. This Court notes that the property description attached to FNMA's Notice of
Default does not match the description of the Property attached to the Trust Deed. Compare: Complaint, at
Exhibit B, p. 2 to Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 16.
14 Complaint, at Exhibit E.
4
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then this Court should declare that the defendants are not entitled to a non-judicia!
foreclosure of the Property. 15
5.

By Count Two of his Complaint, Gordon seeks quiet title to the Property. 16

Gordon alleged that the Trust Deed does not comply with Idaho Code § 45-1502, the
Note and the Trust Deed are split, the Note does not comply with the Idaho Statute of
Frauds, and title in the Property should be quieted to Gordon because the Note is
unsecured. 17
6.

Gordon alleged in Count Three of his Complaint that he is entitled to

damages for unjust enrichment in the event that the defendants fail to produce the original
Note. ls He also claims that, if after discovery, defendants or their assigns cannot show
they had the right to enforce the Note, then they should pay Gordon all sums he paid to
them on the Note. 19
7.

On July 19, 2011, counsel for FNMA, Seterus, and MERS

presented the original Note to Gordon's attorney. 20

Gordon's attorney took the

opportunity to inspect the original Note and the original Trust Deed. 21

IV.
A.

APPLICABLE PRlNCIPLES OF LAW

Dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
1.

The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action

pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (hereinafter "Rule 12(b)(6» is the

Complaint, at p. 6, ~ 25.
Complaint, at p. 7.
17 Complaint, at pp. 7-8.
18 Complaint, at pp. 8-9.
19 Complaint, at p. 9.
20 Affidavit of Derrick J. O'Neill, Gordon v. Federal National Mortgage Association, Bingham County
case no. CY-2011-1069 (filed December 6, 2011) (hereinafter the "O'Neill Affidavit"), at p. 2.
21 Id.
15
16
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same as the standard for adjudicating a motion for summary jUdgment. 22 In other words,
Gordon (the non-moving party) is entitled to have all inferences from the record and
pleadings viewed in his favor and only then can the question be asked whether a claim for
relief had been stated.23
2.

The only facts which may be considered on a motion to dismiss are those

appearing in the Complaint, supplemented by those facts of which a court may properly
take judicial notice. 24
3.

Dismissal of Gordon's Complaint is appropriate only if it appears beyond

doubt that Gordon can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to
relief. 25
4.

If matters outside the pleadings are considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment and the
proceedings thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice requirements of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 26

B.

Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
1.

A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest

on its pleadings.27 When faced with supporting affidavits or depositions, the opposing

Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 PJd 756, 758 (2005); idaho Schools/or Equal Educational
Opportunityv. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,578,850 P.2d 724,729 (]993).
23 Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 PJd 758,761 (2008); Idaho Schools/or Equal Educational
Opportunity, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729.
24 Owsleyv. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005).
25 Taylorv. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,257, 127PJd 156, 160(2005).
26 Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 273,108 P.3d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 2005).
27 Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 688,183 P.3d 771, 776 (2008); R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho
409,410,797P.2d 117, 118(1990).
22
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party must show material issues of fact which preclude the issuance of summary
judgment. 28

2.

While the moving party must prove the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact,29 the opposing party cannot simply speculate. 30 A mere scintilla of evidence is
not enough to create a genuine factual issue. 31 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
non-moving party cannot establish the essential elements of the claim.32

3.

If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on material issues, or

draw conflicting inferences therefrom, then a motion for summary judgment must be
denied. 33

C.

Quiet Title to Real Property.
1.

A mortgagor cannot, without paying his debt, quiet title as against the

mortgagee. J.4

2.

According to the Idaho Supreme Court, "[t]here is no more finnly

established rule than that the liability to pay a mortgage debt rests upon the mortgaged
land as well as upon the mortgagor. A mortgagor carmot without paying his debt quiet
title as against the mortgagee; and the same rule applies to the grantee of a mortgagor,
who takes the land while it is still burdened with a lien for the security of a debt.'~35

Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008).
Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210,214 (2008); Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 798, 41 P.3d 220, 226 (200 I). .
.
30 Cantwell v. City o/Boise, 1461daho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008).
31 Van v. Portneu/ Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009); West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho
133, 138, 968 P.2d 228, 233 (J 998).
32 Summers v. Cambridge Joint School District No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772, 775 (2004);
Dekkerv. Magic Valley Regional Medica! Center, 115 Idaho 332,333,766 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1989).
33 Van v. Portneu/ Medical Center, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986; Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,
873,204 P.3d 508, 513 (2009).
34 Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232,236,249 P.2d 814,817 (1952)
35 Trusty v. Ray, 173 Idaho at 236, 249 P.2d at 817 [citing: Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315,
321,296 P. 192,193 (1931)J.
28

29
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D.

Non-Judicial Foreclosure.
1.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1503(1), a trustee (under a trust deed) may

pursue non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust, but only if the deed of trust has been
"executed in confonnity with [the Idaho Trust Deeds Act.]"
2.

The Idaho Trust Deeds Act is codified under Idaho Code §§ 45-1502-

1515.

E.

Contract Interpretation.

1.

Trust deeds create a contractual power of sale. 36

2.

The objective in interpreting contracts is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the parties.37 The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained from
the language of the documents. 38
3.

A contract must be read as a whole and meaning must be given to all of its

tenns to the extent possible. 39
4.

The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect is a question of

law when the contract is clear and unambiguous. 40
5.

Where two clauses are inconsistent and conflicting, they should be

construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as gathered from the whole

Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Dissolve Preliminary injunction, &
Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Summary Judgm,ent, Carter v. IBM Lender Business Process Services,
Inc., Bonneville County case no. CV-201 J..(j46 (filed January 12, 2012), at p. 9; Memorandum Decision
and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, Jefferson County case no. CV20J 1-45J (filed November 15,2011), at p. 6; Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions for Summary
Judgment, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson, Bonneville County case no. CV-20102922 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 10.
37 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 135, 857 P.2d 61 I, 6J4 (1993)
!;itin~: Luzar v..Western Surety CompanJ!' 107 Idaho 693, 697, 692 P.2d 337, 341 (1984)].
..
TWIn Lakes VlIlage Property ASSOCiatIOn v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 135, 857 P.2d at 614 [cltmg: Suchan
v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 660,682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984)].
39 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 138, 857 P.2d at 617.
36
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contract. 4 I "Apparently conflicting provisions must be reconciled so as to give meaning
to both, rather than nUllifying any contractual provision, if reconciliation can be effected
by any reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument."42 Thus, where possible, a
construction will be placed upon ambiguous or apparently inconsistent provisions of a
contract as will give protection to both parties, as against a construction which would
only be in the interest of one of the parties to the contract. 43

F.

Statute of Frauds.
The Idaho Statute of Frauds reads as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a
term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning
it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a
conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 44

G.

Unjust Enrichment.
1.

The three elements of a claim for unjust enrichment are: (a) a benefit

conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (b) appreciation by the defendant of such
benefit; and (c) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable
for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value
thereof. 45

40 Twin Lakes Village Property Association v. Crowley, 124 Idaho at 135,857 P.2d at 614 [citing: Bondv.
Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996-7, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345-6 (1992)].
41 Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806,10 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct.App. 2000).
42 Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho at 806,10 P.3d at 755 [citing: 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 324 (1999)].
43 Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho at 806, IO P.3d at 755 [citing: Allen v. Ruby Co., 87 Idaho I, 1 1,389 P.2d
581,587 (1964)].
44 Idaho Code § 9-503.
45 Pines Grazing Association, Inc. v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 151 Idaho 924, _,265 P.3d 1136, 1143
(2011).
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2.

The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not permissible where there is an

enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the same subject matter.

V.
A.

46

ANALYIS

The Motion to Dismiss shall be Treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment
Along with the Motion to Dismiss, FNMA, Seterus, and MERS filed the Affidavit

of Derrick 1. O'NeilJ. 47 The O'Neill Affidavit attests that the original Note and the
original Trust Deed were presented to Gordon's counsel on July 19, 2011.48

This

evidence is beyond the parties' pleadings, and relied upon by FNMA, Seterus, and MERS
in their effort to dismiss the Complaint. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss shall be
considered as a motion for summary judgment.

B.

Unrebutted Evidence Disproves Count One of the Complaint.

In his first count, Gordon argues that, if the defendants fail to produce the original
Note and the original Trust Deed, then this Court should declare that they are not entitled
to foreclose upon the Property.49 However, counsel for FNMA, Seterus, and MERS
affied that he tendered the original Note and the original Trust Deed to Gordon's attorney
for inspection. 50 Gordon did not rebut this evidence. Accordingly, Gordon has not raised
1

a material issue of fact with regard to the original Note and the original Trust Deed, and
Count I of the Complaint shall be adjudicated summarily in favor of the defendants.

Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558, 165 P.3d 261,272 (2007).
See: O'Neill Affidavit.
48 O'Neill Affidavit, at p. 2.
49 Complaint, at p. 6, ,25.
50 O'Neill Affidavit, at p. 2.
46

47
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C.

Count Two Fails to State a Claim upon which Relief May be Granted.

Gordon contends that the Trust Deed does not comport with the statutory
requirements of Idaho Code § 45-1502, therefore the defendants, their assigns or
successors, are not entitled to non-judicial foreclosure. 51 Gordon proceeds from this
premise to declare that the defendants' failure to comply with § 45-1502 separates the
Trust Deed and the Note, therefore foreclosure can never o ccur. 52 Gordon adds that a
failed trust deed is not a mortgage under Idaho law and that the Note does not comply
with the Idaho Statute of Frauds. s3

Gordon concludes that the Note is unsecured,

therefore title to the Property should be quieted in Gordon. 54
Initially, the law does not permit Gordon to receive the relief he requests because
he has not satisfied the tender rule. A mortgagor cannot quiet title against a mortgagee
without paying and tendering payment for his debt. 55 This is true even if the mortgage is
unenforceable under the Idaho Statute of Frauds. 56
Gordon does not dispute that he received $342,900.00 in loan proceeds, which
allowed him to purchase the Property. Nor does he dispute defaulting on the loan.
Gordon does not allege that he has paid (or is willing to pay) the amounts still owing on
the Note. This pleading failure dispenses with Gordon's quiet title action. 57

Complaint, at p. 7, ~ 24.
Complaint, at pp. 7-8, ml27, 24, 25 (these are consecutive paragraphs, but apparently misnumbered).
53 Complaint, at p. 8, "26-27.
54 Complaint, at p. 8, , 28.
55 Trustyv. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 236,249 P.2d 814, 817 (1952).
56 Trusty v. Ray,73 Idaho at 236,249 P.2d at 817.
57 See; Washburn v. Bank of America, N.A., 2012 WL 139213, *2 (D. Idaho January 17,2012); Meyer v.
Bank ofAmerica, N.A., 2011 WL 4584762, *3 (September 30, 2011).
51

52
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Even if Gordon had tendered the amount owing on the Note, his Count II cause of
action fails. To illustrate the point, each link in the chain Gordon constructs must ,be
analyzed.
First, Gordon takes the position that the Trust Deed names MERS as both the
beneficiary and the legal title holder, in violation of Idaho Code § 45-1502(1). Idaho
Code § 45-1502(1) defines the beneficiary under a trust deed as "the person named or
otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given,
or his successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee." A "trustee" is defmed as "a
person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor

in interest. ,,58
In the Trust Deed, Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. (hereinafter "Alliance Title") is
named as the trustee. 59 MERS is defined as "a separate corporation that is acting solely
as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary

under this Security Instrument.'>60 The named lender under the Trust Deed is First
Horizon Home Loans, a division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. (hereinafter "First
Horizon,,).61
Thus, at first blush, MERS is named as the beneficiary on behalf of the lender,
First Horizon. The dispute arises under Paragraph R of the Trust Deed, which states:
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (sol~ly as nominee
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the successors and
assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of

Idaho Code § 45-1502(4).
Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2, ~ D.
60 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2, ~ E (emphasis in original).
61 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 1, ~ C.
58

59
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the Note; and (ii) the perfonnance of Borrower's covenants and
agreements under this Security Instnunent and the Note. For this purpose,
Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power
of sale, the [Property] .. _.
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected
on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, and fixtures now or
hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also
be covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to
in this Security Instrument as the "Property." Borrower understands
and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by
Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's
successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those
interests, including but not limited to, the right to foreclosure and sell
{sic] the Property; and to take any action required of Lender
including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security
Instrument. 62
By use of Paragraph R's phrase "MERS holds only legal title," Gordon concludes
that MERS is also the trustee under the Trust Deed, a position inconsistent with its status
as the beneficiary, and prohibited by Idaho Code § 45-1502(1).
To better understand the role of MERS in the real estate lending industry, it is
helpful to refer to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,63 wherein Circuit Judge Callahan wrote:
MERS is a private electronic database, operated by MERSCORP,
Inc., that tracks the transfer of the "beneficial interest" in home loans, as
well as any changes in loan services. After a borrower takes out a home
loan, the original lender may sell all or a portion of its beneficial interest
in the loan and change loan servicers. The owner of the beneficial interest
is entitled to repayment of the loan. For simplicity, we will refer to the
owner of the beneficial interest as the "lender." The servicer of the loan
collects payments from the borrower, sends payments to the lender, and
handles administrative aspects of the loan. Many of the .companies that
participate in the mortgage industry - by originating loans, buying or

62
63

Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3 (emphasis added).
656 F.3d 1034 (9 1h Cir. 2011).
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investing in the beneficial interest in loans, or servIcmg loans - are
members of MERS and pay a fee to use the tracking system. 64
When a borrower takes out a home loan, the borrower executes
two documents in favor of the lender: (1) a promissory note to repay the
loan, and (2) a deed of trust, or mortgage, that transfers legal title in the
property as collateral to secure the loan in the event of default. State laws
require the lender to record the deed in the county in which the property is
located. Any subsequent sale or assignment of the deed must be recorded
in the county records, as welL
This recording process became cumbersome to the mortgage
industry, particularly as the trading of loans increased. 65 It has become
common for original lenders to bundle the beneficial interest in individual
loans and sell them to investors as mortgage-backed securities, which may
themselves be traded. 66 MERS was designed to avoid the need to record
multiple transfers of the deed by serving as the nominal record holder of
the deed on behalf ofthe original lender and any subsequent lender. 67
At the origination of the loan, MERS is designated in the deed of
trust as a nominee for the lender and the lender's "successors and assigns,"
and as the deed's "beneficiary" which hold legal title to the security
interest conveyed. If the lender sells or assigns the beneficial interest in
the loan to another MERS member, the change is recorded only in the
MERS database, not in county records, because MERS continues to hold
the deed on the new lender's behalf. If the beneficial interest in the loan is
sold to a non-MERS member, the transfer of the deed from MERS to the
new lender is recorded in county records and the loan is no longer tracked
in the MERS system.68
In this action, the Trust Deed designates MERS as the beneficiary, solely as
nominee for First Horizon, its successor and assigns. Alliance Title is named as the

64 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d at 1038-9 [citing: Jackson v. Mortg. Elec.
.
Registration Sys., lnc., 770.N.W.2d 487,490 (Minn. 2009)].
65 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1038-9 [citing: Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peacctful
Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 177,178 (2010)].
66 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d at 1039 [citing: Robert E. Dordan, Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peaceful
EXistence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. lnt. L. at 180; Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d at

490.

Cervantes v. CountryWide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1039 [citing: Jackson v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration $ys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d at 490J.
68 Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, lnc., 656 F.3d at 1039.
67
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trustee. However, where the Trust Deed states "Borrower understands and agrees that
MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security
Instrument," Gordon alleges that MERS is latently designated as the trustee.
The Trust Deed clearly identifies Alliance Title as the trustee and MERS as the
beneficiary. In the "Transfer of Rights in the Property" section, Gordon "irrevocably
grants and conveys to Trustee [Alliance Title], in trust, with power of sale, the
[Property].,,69 No such granting language in the Trust Deed transfers the same interest to
MERS, as co-trustee or otherwise. Instead, in the definitions portion of the Trust Deed,
in bold letters, the Trust Deed designates MERS as the beneficiary. Indeed, in the same
paragraph granting the Property in trust to Alliance Title, MERS is again named as the
beneficiary, solely as nomine for the lender, First Horizon, and First Horizon's successors
and assigns. The inconsistency comes with the phrase "MERS holds only legal title to
the interests granted by Lender and Lender's successors and assigns."
Thus, when read as a whole, and in light of the inconsistency between the
designation of MERS as the beneficiary and the phrase "MERS holds only legal title,"
the Trust Deed must be construed such that MERS is the beneficiary and Alliance Title is
the trustee. To hold otherwise thwarts the intention of the parties: to secure Gordon's
loan with the Property. Moreover, to disregard two previous, unambiguous statements in
the Trust Deed that MERS is the beneficiary, and to hold that MERS is the trustee, would
only serve Gordon's interest. Gordon seeks to shirk his responsibility under the terms of
the Trust Deed and the Note by raising the inconsistent language as a bar to the validity
of the Trust Deed.

69

Under Gordon's construction of the inconsistent clause, First

Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3.
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Horizon's interest in the Trust Deed, which is a means of recouping its losses should
Gordon default, would be disregarded altogether.
In addition, our sister courts in Bonneville and Jefferson counties have held that
the "legal title" clause is an expression of the relationship between MERS and the lender,
which gives MERS power, if necessary to act on behalf of the lender as its
representative. 7Q Indeed, Judge Harding opined, and this Court agrees, that the "legal
title" clause
... does nothing more than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust
as nominee for the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS,
as nominee of the lender, power to act on behalf of the lender to foreclose
and sell the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus, the language
referring to a legal interest held by MERS defines an agency relationship
between the lender and MERS regarding lender's rights under the Deed of
Trust. Even considering the provision in isolation, this Court does not
believe the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a legal interest in real
property. This Court must read the Deed of Trust as a whole. Upon doing
so, this Court concludes the Deed of Trust unmistakably defines Alliance
Title as the trustee, and there is no reasonable interpretation of the Deed of
Trust that would make MERS a trustee. 7 !
Nothing in the Trust Deed grants the Property to MERS in trust. Accordingly, the
Trust Deed does not inherently name MERS as the trustee.
Next, Gordon alleges that the Note and the Trust Deed were split at inception
because the lender on the Note is First Horizon, whereas the beneficiary under the terms

70 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, &
Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Summary Judgment, Carler v. IBM Lender Business Process Services,
inc., Bonneville County case no. CV-201 J-646 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 11; Memorandum Decision
and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, Jefferson County case no. CV2011-451 (filed November 15,2011), at p. 7; Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions for Summary
Judgment, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson, Bonneville County case no. CV-20102922 (filed January 12,2012), at p. 11.
71 Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion to Dismiss, Payne v. Chase Home Finance, LLC. Jefferson
County case no. CV-201 1-451 (filed November 15,2011), at pp. 7-8.
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of the Trust Deed is MERS.n Gordon argues that MERS "attempts to rectify the split by
stating that it is acting in some fonn of restricted agency relationship solely as the
nominee for the lender.'>73
First Horizon is named as the lender under both the Note and the Trust Deed. 74
MERS is the designated beneficiary as a "nominee for Lender [First Horizon] and
Lender's successors and assigns.'>75 Idaho Code § 45-1502(1) defines "beneficiary" as
the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit
a trust deed is given. Furthermore, the Trust Deed "secures to [First Horizon]: (i) the
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and
(ii) the performance of [Gordon's] covenants and agreements under this Security

Instrument and the Note."76 The relevant granting language secures First Horizon's Note
and the Gordon's repayment of the Note.
As explained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., MERS acts as the nominal record holder of the Trust Deed on behalf

of First Horizon and any of its successors or assigns who are also MERS members. (If
the Note and the Trust Deed are assigned to a non-MERS member, then the transfer will
be recorded in the Bingham County records.)

First Horizon, its successors and/or

assigns, retains the legal benefit of the Trust Deed. Thus, both the Note and the Trust
Deed secured First Horizon's rights, and those instruments were not split as alleged by
Gordon.

n Complaint, at p. 7, ~ 27.
Id.
74 Complaint, at Exhibit C, p. J; and at Exhibit D, p. 1.
75 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 2,1 E. See also: Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3.
76 Complaint, at Exhibit D, p. 3.
73
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Idaho law allows the assignment of loans. 77 When a note secured by a deed of
trust is assigned, the deed of trust follows the note. 78 The mere fact that the transfer
occurs does not sever the note from the deed of trust.79 Gordon had neither argued nor
demonstrated that an entity other than the Note holder holds the Trust Deed.
Finally, Gordon argues that the Note fails to comply with the Idaho Statute of
Frauds. SO However, the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds. It does not convey an
interest in real property. Instead, it is a unilateral contract acknowledging the borrower's
absolute obligation to repay loaned funds. sl
Gordon also contends the Note was not duly executed.1!2 But Gordon does not
deny his signature on the Note. 83 As a unilateral contract, only.the obligor's (or the
borrower's in this case) signature is necessary for enforcement. 84 Furthermore, under
Chapter 3 of Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument only requires
the signature of "the person undertaking to pay. »85 Gordon does not contend that the
Note is not a negotiable instrument.
Since Gordon has not shown that the Trust Deed fails to comply with Idaho law,
and has not demonstrated a legal defect in the Note, Alliance Title or its successors or
assigns may proceed with non-judicial or judicial foreclosure.

Gordon fails to raise a

material issue offact upon which relief may be granted in Count Two ofms Complaint.

Idaho Code § 28-3-201.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.4(A) (1997) ("A transfer of an
obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree
otherwise. ")
79 In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638 CBkrtey. W.D. Mo. 2010) at *6.
80 Complaint, at p. 8,11 27.
81 See: E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings. Inc., 2004 WL 5641999, *1 (C.D.Cal. October 26, 2004).
82 Complaint, at p. 8,127.
83 See: Complaint, generally and at Exhibit C.
84 See: Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511,515,547 P.2d 1116, J 120 (1976).
77

78
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D.

Gordon's Unjust Enrichment Claim does Not Raise a Material Issue of Fact.
Gordon alleges, in Count Three of his Complaint, "[s]hould [FNMC] fail to

produce the note as demanded by [Gordon] and if after further discovery any of the
Defendants or their assigns or successors cannot properly show that they had the right to
enforce the Note they should be required to pay over to [Gordon] any sums paid by
[Gordon] as payments made on the Note or any payments made to such Defendants. To
allow Defendants to retain such payments that were collected without lawful authority
would unjustly enrich them and [Gordon] should be compensated for bestowing that
benefit upon them."u
As noted above, FNMC produced the Note. Gordon concedes this point, but
argues that the defendants have failed to "prove the transaction" or otherwise show that
they have the right to enforce the Note. 87 Gordon does not dispute that he borrowed the
money and agreed to become obligated to repay it. Nothing in this case reveals that
multiple parties demand payment or claim to hold the Note. Gordon does not allege that
any of his payments were not properly credited toward repayment of the Note. FNMC
holds the Note and has produced it to Gordon. The Note is an enforceable express
contract between Gordon and FNMC. Therefore, Gordon's unjust enrichment action fails
to raise a material fact issue and will be dismissed.
Since dismissal of Gordon's Complaint is appropriate under the facts and the law
presented, the Temporary Restraining Order, entered May

23,

2011, shall be dissolved

and shall be of no further effect as between the parties.

Idaho Code § 28-3- 103 (l)(i).
Complaint, at pp.8-9, ~ 25.
87 Gordon's Objection, at p. 7.
85

86
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VI.
1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Motion to Dismiss should be considered as a motion for summary

judgment.
2.

Gordon does not raise a material fact issue with his allegation that the

defendants failed to maintain and produce the original promissory note.
3.

Gordon does not raise a material issue of fact as to quiet title.

4.

Gordon does not raise a material fact issue regarding unjust enrichment.
VII.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, FNMA's, Seterus's, and
MERS' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. Gordon's Complaint is hereby dismissed.
Gordon shall take nothing by his lawsuit against the defendants named therein.
The Motion, filed by FNMA, Seterus, and MERS, to Dissolve Preliminary
I~unction

is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

,-n4
1L
day of February
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and Dissolving Temporary Restraining
Order/Injunction was s~rved on the parties listed. b~low
,r$tclass mail with prepaid
postage and/or hand dehvered andlor sent by facsImIle thIS
/ day of February 2012,
to;

?y

Rocky L. Wixom, Esq.
Wixom Law Office
P.O. Box 51334
Idaho Falls, ill 83405
Lance E. Olsen, Esq.
Derrick J. O'Neill, Esq.
ROUrn CRABTREE OLSEN, PS
300 Main Street, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83702

~
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Mail
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o
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Courthouse Box
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
JOSHUA R. PAYNE and CARL J. P A 'r'1~E, )
a married couple,
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

Case No. CV -2011-451
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

)

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, believed
to be a foreign Corporation registered in
Idaho; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE
SERVICES, INC., an Idaho Corporation;
ALLIANCE TITLE AND ESCROW
CORP., an Idaho Corporation; FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE, an Idaho Corporation;
and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRA nON SYSTEM, INC.
Defendants.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 19,2008, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note (hereafter, "Note") in fa¥or of
CCSF LLC (hereafter, "CCSF") in exchange for a loan in the amount of $202,040.00. Plaintiffs
concurrently executed a deed of trust (hereafter, "Deed of Trust") to secure repayment of the
Note. The Deed of Trust lists Plaintiffs as "Borrower," CCSF as "Lender," Alliance Title as
"Trustee," and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (hereafter, "MERS") as "[t)he
beneficiary ... (solely as nominee for [CCSF and [CCSF's] successors and assigns)." On
August 26, 2008, the Deed of Trust was recorded 'against the property that Plaintiffs purchased
with the loan money.
In March 20 I 0, Plaintiffs stopped making payments on the Note. On December 29,
2010, MERS assigned all beneficial interest under the Deed of Trust to Chase Home Finance
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LLC (hereafter, "Chase"). Also on December 29,2010, Chase appointed a successor trustee,
replacing Alliance Title with Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. (hereafter, "NTS").
NTS recorded a notice of default on December 30, 20 I 0, declaring Plaintiffs had failed to
make any payments on the Note since before March 2010. Plaintiffs currently maintain
possession ofthe property and have not made any payments for approximately eighteen months.
In January 2011, Chase caused NTS to post and publish notice ofa trustee's sale ofthe
property that would occur on May 16,2011.
Plaintiffs filed the complaint to quiet title in this action on May 13, 20 II. That same day,
this Court entered a temporary restraining order (hereafter, "TRO"). On May 23,2011, this
Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, based in part on Chase's agreement to
voluntarily postpone the trustee's sale of the property during the pendency of this action.
On September 1,2011, Chase, MERS, and First American Title and Escrow Corporation
(hereafter collectively, "Defendants") jointly filed the motion to dismiss that is now before this
Court. On September 12,2011, NTS also filed a motion to dismiss. On October 17, 20 11,
Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants filed a reply
brief on October 20, 20 II. This Court heard oral argmnent regarding the matter on October 24,
2011.

II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when there are no material
issues of fact or law. Davenport v. Bur.ke, 27 Idaho 464, 149 P. 5 j 1 (1915). A court may grant a'
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of[theJ claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief."

LR.C.P. 12(b)(6).
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The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his or her favor. Miles
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). Yet, the non-moving party's
case must be anchored in something more than speculation. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal
Company, 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level." Williams ex rei. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523
F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 927 (2007). The allegations must be more "than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic, 550
U.S. at 555.
A claim has facial plausibility only when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Id. at 556. It asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Jd. at 557. The
United States Supreme Court explained the analysis a court must take when considering a motion
for jUdgment on the pleadings:
Two working principles underlie [our decision in] Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare
recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.
Second, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is contextspecific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common
sense. A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying
allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's
framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
detennine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
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III.

DISCUSSION

In this quiet title action, Plaintiffs intend to prove the invalidity of both the Note and the
Deed of Trust. Defendants assert Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which reI ief can be
granted.

A. Promissory Note
1. Statute of Frauds
Plaintiffs assert the Note is invalid because it does not comply with the statute of frauds.
Defendants assert the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds because it is a negotiable
instrument and not a real-estate sales contract.
Idaho Code § 9-503, Idaho's codification of the statute of frauds for real estate transactions,
states:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument
in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lavvful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
While this action involves an interest in property, the Note itself is not an instrument of
conveyance. As a result, this Court concludes the Note is not subject to the statute of frauds.
A promissory note is a unilateral contract acknowledging the borrower's absolute
obligation to repay loaned funds. See E.B.C. Trust Corp. v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., 2004 WL
5641999, at * 1 (C:D. Cal. Oct. 26,2004). Only the obligor's signature is necessary for
enforcement of a unilateral contract. See Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515
547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976).
In this case, Plaintiffs concede they signed the Note. This Court concludes the Note is a
unilateral contract bearing the obligors signature, and as such, it is enforceable. Moreover,
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Plaintiffs have not contested the Note's qualification as a negotiable instrument. Pursuant to
Chapter 3 of Idaho's Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument only requires the
signature of "the person undertaking to pay."

I.e. § 28-3-103(1)(i).

This Court concludes Plaintiffs' statute of frauds argument does not present a viable
means of sustaining their cause of action.

2. "Wet Ink" Original
Plaintiffs assert Defendants cannot proceed with foreclosure without first proving
enforceability of the note, and Defendants cannot enforce the note unless they present the "wet

ink" original version of it.
Defendants assert that production of the original note is not required to proceed in
foreclosure.
Plaintiffs cite Nielson v. Westrom, 46 Idaho 686, 270 P. 1054 (1928) for the proposition
that "payment to a person who is not in possession of the paper is wholly at the risk of the
payor." Regardless of that rule, the issue in this case is not whether Defendants are actually in
possession of the original note. The issue, rather, is whether Defendants can proceed in
foreclosure without producing the original note. To answer that, this Court must consider the
statutory requirements for non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Those requirements are set
out in Idaho Code §§ 45-1505 and 45- I 506. This Court has conducted a thorough review of
those statutes and concludes there is no requirement that the original note be produced prior 'to
foreclosure. Furthennore, other courts have held that "production of the note is not required to
proceed in foreclosure." Tang v. California Reconveyance Co., 2011 WL 2581416, at

* 5 (ND.

Cal. 2011); see also Roque v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 2010 WL 546896 (N.D.Cal. 2010).
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This Court concludes Plaintiffs' "wet ink" argument does not present a viable means of
sustaining Plaintiffs' cause of action in this case.

B. Deed of Trust
Plaintiffs assert the Deed of Trust is void because it purports to make MERS both a
beneficiary and a trustee in violation of the Idaho Trust Deeds Act.
Defendants assert the Deed of Trust is valid and enforceable because, when read as a
whole, the Deed of Trust does not assign an impermissible dual role to MERS.
Compared to mortgage requirements, the Deed of Trust Procedures
authorized by statute make it far easier for lenders to forfeit the borrower's
interest in the real estate securing a loan, and also abrogate the right of
redemption after sale guaranteed under a mortgage foreclosure. [Citation
omitted.) A mortgage generally may be foreclosed only by filing a civil action
while, under a Deed of Trust, the trustee holds a power of sale permitting him to
sell the property out of court with no necessity of judicial action. The Deed of
Trust statutes thus strip borrowers of many of the protections available under a
mortgage. Therefore, lenders must strictly comply with the Deed of Trust
statutes, and the statutes and Deeds of Trust must be strictly construed in favor of
the borrower.

Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Bishop, 109 Idaho 25, 28,704 P.2d 357, 360 (Ct. App. 1985).
A deed of trust creates a contractual power of sale, and like other contracts, is ambiguous
if it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292,
293,612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). The construction of an ambiguous instrument is a question of
fact to be resolved by the jury in this case. The court must construe the instrument "as a whole
and consider it in its entirety to determine whether it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations." Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 781, 747 P.2d 1302, 1310(1987).
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1503, the trustee of a deed of trust may pursue non-judicial
foreclosure only if the deed of trust has been "executed in conformity with the Idaho Trust Deeds
Act." That Act defines "beneficiary" as "the person named or otherwise designated in a trust
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deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and v,:ho
shall not be the trustee." I.C. § 45-1502. The parties agree the Deed of Trust designates MERS
as the beneficiary. The parties dispute, however, whether the Deed of Trust also designates
MERS as a trustee. "Trustee" is defmed as "a person to whom the legal title to real property is
conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest."

I.e. § 45-1502(4).

Although for practical purposes a deed of trust is only a mortgage with
power of sale, title to the real estate does pass for the purpose of the trust. Long v.
Williams, 105 Idaho 585,587-88,671 P.2d 1048,1050-51 (1983). Legal title to
the property is conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee. I.e. § 45-1502(4).

Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 665, 978 P.2d 222, 225 (1999).
In this case, Page 1 of the Deed of Trust unambiguously designates Alliance Title as
"Trustee." The Deed of Trust also states,
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests
granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not
limited to, the right to foreclose and sel1 the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this
Security Instrument.
Deed of Trust at 3.
Plaintiffs assert the foregoing language "inherently defines MERS as a trustee."
Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition at 12. The issue is whether the foregoing provision purports to
give MERS a legal interest in the real property or in something else. This Court believes the
language does nothing more than give MERS a legal interest in the Deed of Trust as nominee for
the lender. In other words, the Deed of Trust gives MERS, as nominee ofthe lender, power to
act on behalf of the lender to foreclose and sel1 the property or cancel the Deed of Trust. Thus
the language referring to a legal interest held by MERS defines an agency relationship between
the lender and MERS regarding lender's rights under the Deed of Trust. Even considering the
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provision in isolation, this Court does not believe the Deed of Trust purported to give MERS a
legal interest in real property. This Court must read the Deed of Trust as a whole. Upon dGing
so, this Court concludes the Deed of Trust unmistakably defines Alliance Title as the trustee, and
there is no reasonable interpretation of the Deed of Trust that would make MERS a trustee.
This Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to present law and facts sufficient to maintain
their argument that the deed of trust is void.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In addition to the conclusions reached above, this Court notes that Plaintiffs have never
presented any argument that they are not in default, that they made payments that were not
credited, that the amount owed is inaccurate, or any other cognizable legal claim. Plaintiffs
admit they have not made loan payments for approximately eighteen months, and they have not
asserted they are currently able to afford their loan.
It appears beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim

that would entitle them to relief, and there exist no triable issues of material fact that preclude
this Court fonn granting Defendants' motion for dismissal.
It appears to the Court that good cause for the entry of this Order has been shown; now

therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all
causes of action asserted, and there are no genuine issues of material fact existing. For these
reasons, this case is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants prepare and submit to this Court a
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order.
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f1.
DATED this ___--_ day of November 20 11.

~o<~,

lIA~ING

DON
Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 9

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r hereby certify that on this _

\

(../

\ ~ day of November 2011, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by
causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Rocky L. Wixom
WIXOM LA W OFFICE

P.O. Box 51334
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Sheila R. Schwager
& HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suit 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bormeville County, Idaho
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Case: 11-1010

Document: 00116305063

Page: 1

Date Filed: 12/14/2011

Entry 10: 5603186

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1010
DAVID KlAH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.

Before
Torruella, Boudin and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

Entered: December 14,2011
Appellant David Kiah filed this removed and dismissed action to void a mortgage and its
assignment to defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC, and to obtain damages for "fraudulent
conveyance and slander of title." Essentially for the reasons explained in the district court's
Amended Memorandum and Order, entered March 4,2011, the judgment of dismissal and the denial
of post-judgment relief are affirmed. We add only that removability is determined under federal, not
state law; and that there is no meaningful overlap between the service members action and the
removed action such as would justify abstention under any doctrine.
Affirmed.
By the Court:
lsi Margaret Carter, Clerk.

Case: 11-1010

Document: 00116305063

cc:
David Francis Kiah
John A. Doonan
Reneau Jean Longoria
Erin P. Severini
Stephen M. Valente

Page: 2

Date Filed: 12/14/2011

Entry 10: 5603186

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LESLIE JENSEN-EDWARDS,
Appellant,
vs.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. AS NOMINEE and
BENEFICIARY and QUALITY LOAN SERVICES, AS ATTORNEY IN FACT AND
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; and PIONEER LENDER TRUSTEE SERVICES, LLC AS
TRUSTEE,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,
INC.'S OPENING BRIEF - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Number 38604-2011
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County.
Appeal from the Honorable Lansing Haynes, District Judge, presiding.

Leslie Jensen-Edwards
2600 E. Seltice Way
Suite 144
Post Falls, ID 83854
Appellant in Pro Per

Derrick J. O'Neill, ISB No. 4021
Brian Langford, ISB No. 7747
Routh Crabtree Olsen P.S.
300 Main Street, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83702
(208.489.3035)
Robert J. Pratte, pro hac vice
application pending
Brent R. Lindahl, pro hac vice
application pending
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
80 South 8th Street, Suite 2100
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612.321.2244)
Attorneys for Respondents
Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc.

Holger Uhl, Esq.
McCarthy & Holthus
LLP
8995 SW Miley Road
Suite 103
Wilsonville, OR 97070
Attorney for Quality
Loan Service
Corporation and Pioneer
Lender Trustee Services
'LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certifY that two copies of the Respondents' Opening
Brief and this certificate of service was served upon the following designated parties, by
first class mail, at the address listed below:
Leslie Jensen-Edwards
2600 E. Seltice Way
Suite 144
Post Falls, ID 83854
Appellant in Pro Per
Holger Uhl, Esq.
McCarthy & Holthus LLP
8995 SW Miley Road
Suite 103
Wilsonville, OR 97070
Attorney for Quality Loan
Service Corporation and
Pioneer Lender Trustee
Services LLC
Dated and certified this L d a y of July, 2012

ROUTH CRABTREE OLSEN, P.S.

Bri~

